BILDERBERG MEETINGS

BAD RAGAZ

CONFERENCE

17 - 19 April 1970

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

CHAIRMAN:
H.R.H. The Prince of the Netherlands

HONORARY SECRETARY GENERAL FOR EUROPE:
Ernst H. van der Beugel

HONORARY SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE UNITED STATES:
Joseph E. Johnson

HONORARY TREASURER:
Johannes Meynen

Agnelli, Giovanni	Italy
Alliot, Michel	France
Allison, Graham	United States
Altissimo, Renato	Italy
Ashby, Sir Eric	United Kingdom
Ball, George W.	United States
Baumgartner, Wilfrid S.	France
Benediktsson, Bjarni	Iceland
Bennett, Sir Frederic	United Kingdom
Berchtold, Walter	Switzerland
Bernardini, Gilberto	Italy
Beuve-Méry, Hubert	France
Birgi, M. Nuri	Turkey
Brinkhorst, Laurens Jan	Netherlands
Brouwer, L. E. Jan	Netherlands
Brugsma, Willem L.	Netherlands
Camu, Louis	Belgium
Collado, Emilio G.	United States
Cornu, Daniel	Switzerland

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CULVER, JOHN C.	UNITED STATES
DEAN, ARTHUR H.	UNITED STATES
DEURINCK, GASTON	BELGIUM
DRAKE, SIR ERIC	UNITED KINGDOM
DUCHENE, L. FRANCOIS	INTERNATIONAL
EDWARDS, SIR RONALD	UNITED KINGDOM
FASCELL, DANTE B.	UNITED STATES
FAURE, EDGAR	FRANCE
FILION, GÉRARD	CANADA
FROSCHMAIER, FRANZ	INTERNATIONAL
FURGLER, KURT	SWITZERLAND
GERWIG, ANDREAS A.	SWITZERLAND
GISCARD D'ESTAING, OLIVIER	FRANCE
GOODPASTER, ANDREW J.	INTERNATIONAL
GRIFFIN, ANTHONY G. S.	CANADA
HATTERSLEY, ROY	UNITED KINGDOM
HAUGE, GABRIEL	UNITED STATES
HEAD, IVAN	CANADA
HEINZ II, HENRY J.	UNITED STATES
HØEGH, LEIF	NORWAY
HOLLAND, STUART	UNITED KINGDOM
JANSSEN, DANIEL	BELGIUM
JORDAN JR., VERNON E.	UNITED STATES
KAISER, KARL	GERMANY
KEPPEL, FRANCIS	UNITED STATES
KING, ALEXANDER	INTERNATIONAL
KNOPPERS, ANTONIE	UNITED STATES
KOHNSTAMM, MAX	INTERNATIONAL
KROGH, PETER F.	UNITED STATES
LANGSLET, LARS R.	NORWAY
LENNEP, JONKHEER EMILE VAN	INTERNATIONAL
LEPAN, DOUGLAS V.	CANADA
LESGUILLONS, HENRI	INTERNATIONAL
LEVI, ARRIGO	ITALY
LIOTARD-VOGT, PIERRE	SWITZERLAND
LIPSET, SEYMOUR, M.	UNITED STATES
LUNS, JOSEPH M. A. H.	NETHERLANDS
MACH, BERNARD	SWITZERLAND
MATHIAS JR., CHARLES McC.	UNITED STATES
MAUDLING, REGINALD	UNITED KINGDOM

MEYERSON, MARTIN	UNITED STATES
MOBERG, SVEN	SWEDEN
MOYERS, BILL D.	UNITED STATES
NOGUEIRA, ALBERTO F.	PORTUGAL
NYKOPP, JOHAN A.	FINLAND
ØRVIK, NILS	NORWAY
PRICE, CHRISTOPHER	UNITED KINGDOM
REINHARDT, EBERHARD	SWITZERLAND
RHODES JR., JOSEPH	UNITED STATES
RICHARDSON, ELLIOT L.	UNITED STATES
ROBERTS, JOHN	CANADA
ROCKEFELLER, DAVID	UNITED STATES
ROCKEFELLER, IV, JOHN D.	UNITED STATES
ROLL, SIR ERIC	UNITED KINGDOM
ROTHSCHILD, BARON EDMOND DE	FRANCE
SCHAEFER, ALFRED	SWITZERLAND
SCHMIDHEINY, MAX	SWITZERLAND
SILVERS, ROBERT	UNITED STATES
SØRENSEN, SVEND O.	DENMARK
STOLTENBERG, GERHARD	GERMANY
STONE, SHEPARD	UNITED STATES
STREICHENBERG, GEORGES	SWITZERLAND
TERKELSEN, TERKEL M.	DENMARK
TIDEMAND, OTTO G.	NORWAY
TSCHUDI, HANS P.	SWITZERLAND
UMBRICHT, VICTOR H.	SWITZERLAND
VANCE, CYRUS R.	UNITED STATES
VEDEL, GEORGES	FRANCE
WALLENBERG, MARCUS	SWEDEN
WARIS, KLAUS	FINLAND
WEIZSAECKER, RICHARD FREIHERR VON	GERMANY
WOLFF VON AMERONGEN, OTTO	GERMANY

IN ATTENDANCE:

CITTADINI CESI, MARCHESE GIAN G.	ITALY
REUTLINGER, PAUL	SWITZERLAND
ROY, BERTIE LE	NETHERLANDS
VERNÈDE, EDWIN	NETHERLANDS

INTRODUCTION

The nineteenth Bilderberg Meeting was held at Hotel Quellenhof in Bad Ragaz (Switzerland) on 17, 18 and 19 April 1970 under the Chairmanship of H.R.H. The Prince of the Netherlands.

There were 95 participants from the United States, Canada and 14 Western European countries as well as from various international organizations. They consisted of members of governments, politicians, prominent businessmen, journalists, leading national and international civil servants and outstanding representatives of the academic world and other groups.

In accordance with the rules adopted at each Meeting, all participants spoke in a purely personal capacity without in any way committing whatever government or organization to which they might belong. In order to enable participants to speak with the greatest possible frankness the discussions were confidential, with no representatives of the press being admitted.

The Agenda was as follows:

I. Future Function of the University in our Society.

II. Priorities in Foreign Policy.

ITEM I

H.R.H. The Prince of the Netherlands opened the Meeting and recalled the Bilderberg rules of procedure.

The Prince expressed the gratitude of the Conference for the hospitality in Switzerland to the President of the Swiss Confederation who was present as a participant.

FUTURE FUNCTION OF THE UNIVERSITY IN OUR SOCIETY

The discussion of this item on the agenda was prepared by three introductory working papers written respectively by an American professor (who was prevented at the last moment from attending the conference), an English participant, and a French participant.

SUMMARY OF THE AMERICAN WORKING PAPER ON THE UNIVERSITY AND SOCIETY

The University in the United States is under pressure, but it does not prosper under pressure—at least of the kind to which it has been subjected over the past five years.

Its relations with society are delicate. Since it must be a servant of society and independent of it, the University is at one and the same time an instrument of social cohesion and national identity, and an indispensable instrument for social criticism. In times of social stability this relationship is manageable. But changes induced by the prospects and promises of recent years have been so rapid that few institutions have been able to prepare for the inevitable demands resulting from them.

A number of particularly serious pressures are currently being exerted on the University.

The first is the increased demand for admission, especially in the field of higher education. The root cause is to be found in the requirements of modern technological society, whose need for trained manpower is insatiable. No country can hope to provide the leadership necessary for a modern society if only a very small fraction acquire the equivalent of a college or University

degree. (The author estimated that 30% of the relevant age group going through secondary school and 5% of the relevant age group going through University are the threshhold figures for a modern society.) But though secondary education has been democratized, leading to a greater number of University enrolments, higher education is still planned on the traditional bases of professional standards and high selectivity.

The second pressure on the Universities is inadequate finance, which is linked with the problem of numbers. The lack of resources is further aggravated by negligence in planning, and the productivity of higher education has not improved. One consequence of this has been an enormous increase in the use of public funds in University budgets. This has led to increased public surveillance of academic expenditures, which in turn raises deep problems about the future autonomy of the educational system. The University, as it relies more heavily on public funding, is held accountable not only for its use of those funds but for its actions on other matters—notably its handling of student unrest.

A third problem arises from the demand for relevance. Traditional education offers little nourishment for the most crucial needs of the emerging countries, or for the needs of some older countries which are in the process of modernization. A better curricular balance is called for between the humanities, the social sciences and the natural sciences, with a distinction between abstract and applied studies. True, in more mature countries the drive to make studies relevant to the new problems of society is strong, but it is significant that it is no longer taken for granted that abstract studies may sooner or later promote the solution of real problems.

Moreover (noted the author of the working paper), as the number of students has increased, larger and wider cross-sections of our societies have been admitted to the Universities; many of today's students are ill-prepared for the rigor of their studies, and they expect that there should be a direct connection between what they are taught and the agonies of the environments from which they come.

Even a casual observer will see the connection between numbers, costs and relevance. To provide education that is relevant to a variety of demands is a costly business, and higher costs require demonstrably higher relevance. An ironic feature of the current scene is the fact that the feeding of the cycle of numbers, costs and relevance is in large part the result of the University's successful adaptation to the demands made upon it. But even an adequate integration of these three interrelated issues cannot alone create the atmosphere in which the University is struggling to perform its mission today. There are deeper and more complex problems involved, among them the relation of the University to the priorities of society.

At the beginning of the '60s, at least in the more developed countries, the leading edge of these societies shifted its social priorities away from affluence, full employment, and peace-keeping by military power, towards more preoccupation with justice for the minorities and for the poor, the quality of the environment, and peace-keeping through the subordination of national ambitions to the idea of the international community. One feature of this was the adoption by young people of a new scale of values, while their elders were not inclined to give up the old values. True, the generation gap has always existed, but present-day social conditions add to it. Young people's dissatisfaction with society has led to problems which are not merely complex but explosive.

In these circumstances it was inevitable that the University, while trying to deal with its internal priorities, should find the new social concerns of its students almost impossible to resolve, the more so since the students were not content to have the University function as a neutral forum. Having become so closely identified with the society that supported it, the University became a target for opposition. The question that remains is whether the University is more valuable as a neutral arena for inquiry and debate, or whether it is more valuable as a lever for social reforms.

In this connection, the author noted that in a society where there is a substantial consensus on main priorities, University neutrality becomes more possible. The countries that have had the most difficulty with their Universities have been those with the deepest divisions in their social philosophies and social programmes. In these countries, the problem has become a political one.

Most countries are trying to avoid the two extremes of neutrality and social activism by ensuring that the University retains the maximum of independence from society while also making concessions to the new concerns in admissions policy and in curricular ventures. But the key problem of the University's mission still remains, and division of opinion on this question has triggered a long series of crises.

Beyond this problem, there is another and deeper one which imperils the very idea of the University itself. This is the emergence of a skepticism that denies the possibility of objective, rational thought. The belief that reasoning man will increasingly comprehend his environment to the benefit of a better evolution of mankind is a notion that has less currency with each passing year. In its place has arisen an intuitive approach proceeding from the dark reaches of the mind. The acquisition of knowledge is no longer considered to be a cumulative process, and the opportunity for rational discourse is not seen as a raison d'être of the University.

It is therefore not surprising that the problem of University administration

is both universal and pressing. Yet, even in the face of these difficulties, the University cannot afford to ignore its obligation to try to become what society must become—an open, rational, self-disciplined and essentially humane community. It must work with society on the difficult task of reordering its priorities and remodelling its institutions to deal effectively with our great new purposes. In other words, the University community can point the paths and light the way for society, but it cannot expect society to fall in line. There can be no doubt, however, that the University and the intellectual community that it represents have a political and social role. The University's responsibility is first and foremost to maintain a balance between itself and society, to set its own standards which are independent of society's pressures and yet compatible with its goals. Furthermore, the University must address itself to preparing the next generation for dealing with matters which are now only dimly perceived. It is the fulfillment of this role of maintaining a balance which is undoubtedly among the most difficult and delicate tasks facing the University, and it is a subject which will continue to preoccupy all those who would see the University survive.

SUMMARY OF THE ENGLISH WORKING PAPER ON THE FUTURE FUNCTION OF THE UNIVERSITY IN OUR SOCIETY

The British author of this working paper took as his point of departure student unrest. What, he asked, can our generation learn from a sit-in? First, that no such movement can mobilize massive support except on a *moral* issue; secondly, that such a demonstration is a stirring experience for those who take part in it; it satisfies a deep hunger for a community spirit. This confronts our generation with two questions about the future of the University in our society: should the University impart a moral content to higher education? And should Universities be designed as communities to satisfy this hunger for social cohesion among students?

A DEFINITION OF FUNCTION

Without straying into semantic discussions about the meaning of the word "University", the author referred to the underlying purpose as expressed by Rashdall 70 years ago in writing about Universities in the Middle Ages. Their great contribution to society, he wrote, was that "they placed the administration of human affairs . . . in the hands of educated men".

This statement unambiguously expresses the fact that, by tradition, Universities are primarily concerned with educating people. Research, advice to governments, service to industry—for centuries activities like these have been

undertaken as sidelines. It is only recently that they have competed with the prime function. The author invited the meeting to begin its discussion with a consideration of this point, namely whether the principal contribution of the University to society for the rest of this century should still be to educate all who are likely to bear responsibility in the various sectors of present-day society. If this proposition is accepted, other activities carried on in the University have to be justified by their relevance to this central function.

TO WHOM IS THE UNIVERSITY RESPONSIBLE?

This was the preliminary question posed by the Rapporteur. Is the University responsible to its students, regarded as clients? To the corporations or services or professions which employ graduates? To parliament, which finances higher education? Or should the University be responsible only to itself as a guild of masters and scholars?

It can be said that the shape and size of a University system in any country depends on the balance between three social forces: the pressure from candidates to enter the system (as in the United States); the suction from employers (as in the Soviet Union, where the demands of the State predominate); and the inner controls excercised by the system itself (as in Great Britain). But in the three countries cited, the factor which previously dominated has in recent years declined in importance to the benefit, partly or wholly, of the two others. The author himself was inclined to reject an exclusive responsibility to any of these three "customers". There remains the residual case. But the objection to this case is familiar.

A University run by professors becomes a University run for professors; but the function of the University is to put the administration of human affairs in the hands of educated men, and professors are not very experienced about human affairs.

The author illustrated the difficulty of replying to this question by three comments:

1. The achievements of knowledge rest upon continuity, consistency of approach and the slow development of the inner logic of a subject. If the determination of what is to be taught were to be solely in the hands of students or employers this continuity would be repeatedly interrupted. The fragmentation of knowledge would be made even worse, the fragments would have less cohesion.

2. The danger of too close a control by parliament is that education becomes politicized and loses its capacity to criticize society in a detached way.

3. To leave the sole responsibility to Universities themselves has not, in the past, produced encouraging results.

THE THREE BASIC QUESTIONS

The author then put three fundamental questions which, he claimed, could not be dissociated:

Who is to be taught at Universities?

What is to be taught?

Who is to teach?

The first of these questions is the most difficult, in view of the tide of social equality in Western society. There is no prospect that student numbers will be contained even within their present dimensions; there are only two limiting factors: the limit of benefit which a degree or diploma offers to the individual, and how much the State can afford. This latter limitation can affect the number of students, and also the quality of teaching. Here again, there is a dilemma and a danger—that of neglecting or cheapening the education of those to be entrusted with the administration of human affairs.

This is why it may be considered that whatever arrangements a country may make to provide mass higher education, there must be filters in the University system, and opportunities must be given to the most gifted minds, sometimes in an austere discipline, to develop their capacities. The nature of these filters is controversial; a massive failure rate (as in France) or a very stringent selection (as in Britain) are not good solutions. Perhaps solutions may be found in some form of stratification between and within Universities or between different kinds of institutions; or again in a widening of basic higher education, subsequent to which only a small proportion of students are selected to receive the most exacting apprenticeship the University can offer.

The difficulties of this last-named quality of education are that it cannot be provided except through close contact with teachers who are themselves distinguished; and our techniques for selecting the students to receive it are unreliable. In this connection, employers in the future should be much more willing than they are now to release potential leaders for two to three years of University education as adult students; and Universities should be more flexible in accepting such students.

Refresher courses would then become one of the University's major activites, and not a sideline.

The University must be, at one and the same time, popular and "élitist". Somewhere in the University, whatever other activities it has, a very few selected students must be educated very well. However egalitarian society gets, its fortunes will depend upon the ideas, the work and the influence of a handful of perceptive men.

Considering this to be the University's most important function, the author dealt with the other two questions (what is to be taught and who is to teach) with reference to this élite minority.

What is to be taught? The author considered that, in some institutions, certain disciplines are already well taught, notably in respect of technological human affairs.

The problem is not what to teach about physics to potential physicists, about medicine to medical students, or about economics to students who are going to become economists, but to ask *what else* should the University teach to physicists, doctors, economists? And—since the highest responsibilities in the management of human affairs frequently fall upon men who are not specialists—what should the University offer to men with this destiny before them? What, especially, is the place of humanistic studies in the University as here defined?

In view of the fact that a specialist may be confronted, in his narrow professional work, with poignant issues for which the University has not prepared him, and that the "generalist" in the civil service or in industry may be dealing all the time with problems of this order (for example, pollution, trade in armaments with the Third World, the integration of minority groups into society), how does the University educate them to administer affairs like these?

There are some who say that the management of these affairs is learned only through experience. But this is not a satisfactory answer. Students demand what they call "relevance", though by this they usually mean a sort of intellectual parochialism. This sort of relevance has to be rejected. But there is another sort. The prevailing matrix of University studies presupposes objectivity, rational thought disengaged from its consequences, the privilege of being able to think without taking decisions. But in the administration of human affairs decisions have to be taken, and if they are not governed by principles, they have to be governed by expediency. Some critics assert that the principles which guide intellectuals in administration are untaught but nonetheless there. They call them "counter-revolutionary subordination", by which they mean the enlistment of intellectuals in a conspiracy to preserve the status quo. These critics distort the situation, but nevertheless they are fumbling towards something important. The University can only function under a "moral code of liberalism", but this is not a sufficient guide to contemporary issues in the administration of human affairs. By its very silence about the moral implications of scholarship the University does make assumptions about moral questions.

This does not mean that a kit of moral principles should be taught. Nor potted courses on ethics or sociology. The solution is perhaps to be found through an entirely different approach, with the aid of men who are already administering human affairs, and involving, for example, interdisciplinary seminars at which all the aspects of a given problem are exhausted. A second approach would be to examine very thoroughly the ways in which the very techniques and conventions of scholarship carry their own repertoire of moral principles (for example, the virtues of humility, courage, tolerance and respect for the humanity of others). Taken as ingredients of a University education, these studies—which could also be of a multidisciplinary nature, with the participation of professional men—could contribute to conveying to the élite among students the dismaying experience of navigating towards decisions equipped only with incomplete charts. For the administration of human affairs by expediency and not by principles is a course which Universities ought to be ashamed to contemplate. If the student's solution to these problems is commonly based on naive principles, it is because he has not been given the opportunity of discovering any sounder ones.

The other lesson drawn from recent events is the students' hunger for some common purpose to cement the community of youth, and their evident delight at the shallow but euphoric solidarity which unites them in some protest or other. The common belief that they exclude their elders from this community does not seem to be correct. Many students break their ties with home and family in various ways, and seem to need to find a substitute for home and family at the University. Only a few English and American Colleges and Universities traditionally supply this substitute. The concept of the University as a community of senior and junior scholars may be more important for the stability of the Universities of 1970-2000 than we are at present disposed to grant. For the University cannot hope to fulfill its function unless there is common consent between its senior and junior members as to the purpose of the place. And this common consent may not be possible unless there is a deliberately created pattern of partnership in which the student feels he has a secure and clearly defined place. Finally, the third question: who shall teach? In former times, especially in the great British Universities, the professors were chosen on grounds of both erudition and piety. This is now out of date; professors are now appointed on criteria of scholarship. It is a common complaint on both sides of the Atlantic that insufficient weight is given to the professor's record as a teacher, and none to his record as a companion for youth.

The prime criterion should be—as it already is—quality of mind; for only the flexible, innovative, lively mind can teach others how to adapt the knowledge of the past to the needs of the future. The Universities should remain centres of research, otherwise they will not attract innovators. In particular, there are grave dangers in suggesting that research should be concentrated into research institutes.

Posts at Universities should be made more attractive to men of powerful and original minds. But these minds are needed also by the State and by industry. Therefore many professors find themselves using the University as a base for extra-mural activities. This is a serious problem. On the one hand, it is essential that professors should not be isolated from the outside world. On the other hand, in some Universities professors would be indignant if it were suggested to them that educating the young and doing research relevant to their teaching added up to a full time job. One possible solution might be to enlist the cooperation of professional associations and government services and industry in two ways: by "lending" them professors to advise and consult, and by "borrowing" men of high intelligence and experience from these associations and institutions outside the University, who would come back to the University at certain periods to expose their ideas and principles.

THREE POSTSCRIPTS

1. Pressure is sometimes put on Universities to take a corporate stand on some aspect of human affairs. In times of extremely grave crisis this may be inevitable, but the University's contribution to society is far more valuable if it is made through its individual staff and graduates acting as individuals. The University cannot seek to exercise power without surrendering freedom— its own freedom and that of its individual members. This would inevitably affect the regard in which their teaching is held. It is therefore undesirable to add the word "service" to the functions of the University, except in respect of one kind of service: "to place the administration of human affairs . . . in the hands of educated men".

2. Some people hope that the boundaries between the University and the community may dissolve; this view is held not only by students who consider the University as an intellectual service station, but also by governments and industrialists because it enables them to get expert advice from distinguished professors on the cheap. But the University must remain an institution with an identifiable function which takes precedence over the many other activities it is inevitably expected to accept if it is to do its unique job for society.

3. In the past, one outstanding contribution of Universities was that they endowed their graduates with a common core of culture. To wish for the revival of this common core of culture is unprofitable nostalgia. Yet if the University could give its graduates some similar common and shared endow-

ment it would be a valuable cement to society. This might be possible through a common approach to complex social problems involving a repertoire of model principles arising from the mastery of the symbols of communication.

SUMMARY OF THE FRENCH WORKING PAPER ON TRANSFORMATIONS IN SOCIETY AND THE REPLANNING OF EDUCATION

It is generally agreed that the primary aim of an educational system is to help man to achieve happiness. But this objective is itself a source of confusion if the relationship between man and his society is in the process of complete transformation.

For a long time, he seems to have been in harmony with society. Not long ago, helping man to achieve happiness meant helping him to understand the world, to fit into it intellectually and to participate in its work.

For those who were admitted to it, school was a privileged place which enabled this objective to be attained. Society evolved so slowly that knowledge acquired during childhood or youth was sufficient for a lifetime.

Today, however, we live not in a subsistence society but in a dynamic one, in which a large part of the population is able to acquire goods of lasting material and cultural utility. This revolution has produced new anxieties, new possibilities and new needs—anxiety on the part of young people, and the democratization and permanence of teaching.

Parellel with this, the increasingly technological nature of society gives rise to similar phenomena: fear of competition between man and the computer, new perspectives offered by educational technology, and the necessity of new ways of thinking.

Consequently a discord between man and society has come about. Will man be able to master this evolution? To do so, our educational system will have to be radically modified. It is not sufficient to gain control of the existing evolution—we must also look ahead to tomorrow's evolution, and bend it to our will rather than suffer what it offers us.

This is a subject for deep concern, for we are approaching a serious transformation; in the course of human evolution, man has developed his intelligence at the expense of his physical capacities. But the computers, created by man, now have an ability to store and analyze information far in excess of man's own. What faculties, unknown or barely suspected by us, will man have to acquire in the future? What new priorities will he have to adopt?

Faced with this transformation, we shall have to make certain choices. This being so, helping man to achieve happiness by making the proper choices becomes the major aim of our educational system. And in order to be in a posi-

tion to make these choices, we must first of all become the masters of our evolution. What transformations will our educational system have to undergo to this end?

EDUCATION AND THE DYNAMIC SOCIETY

On the purely economic level, we must relegate to the attic the myth that social progress is achieved by revolution. Progress can be achieved provided that we understand how to organize, not a sharing out of the goods at present available to mankind, but a corrective sharing of goods not yet created. But this implies the need for a new social contract, a contract of advancement in which everyone is granted his share of the advantages and takes his share of responsibility. This applies, of course, to cultural expansion as well as to economic expansion. Education must give everyone an equal chance of advancement.

But this also supposes that education is not limited to a specific period in life, and that it is not restricted to schools and Universities. Education must be continuous, and it must use not only individual resources but also the resources of mass communications.

The democratization of education: in France, this has been achieved quantitatively but not qualitatively. The uniformity of the teaching received by all students and the obligation for all of them to pass the same examinations has masked inequalities due to family situations and backgrounds, particularly because certain children are better able to express themselves and to conceptualize than others. This inequality can be removed only through a cultural policy which does not give priority to literary education and dissertation.

The continuation of education: though the transformation of society makes it imperative that education be a continuing process, little collective thought has been given to this point so far. We must immediately and seriously organize a system of adult education which is not just a series of training courses or refresher courses. If we are to do this, we must review our school and university system. Why not right away reduce the duration of full-time University education, in view of the necessity of updating and subsequently enriching the knowledge acquired at Universities and higher educational establishments? Moreover, it must be possible at any moment to change course, instead of setting course for a whole lifetime on the basis of knowledge acquired at the beginning. This reorientation must be facilitated by following common broad streams for as long as possible; this would have the additional great advantage of creating a "common language". In this connection, we must bear in mind the cost in money and human effort which reconversion at present involves. Furthermore, the updating and broadening of knowledge and skills does not

necessarily involve going to school. Where adult training and education are concerned, teaching facilities must go out to the people, and not vice-versa. This applies also to the role played by the press, the cinema, television, and administrative authorities. Such extramural education should be directed mainly at areas undergoing development or industrialization, and benefit those categories of people who are least well prepared. Every citizen must be aware of his responsibility.

The continuing nature of education thus disrupts the teaching process. No longer can teaching be equated with the transmission of knowledge. We have to learn to learn. On the one hand, the amount of spare time is increasing, and all must be able to make best use of it; on the other hand, people must be enabled to adapt themselves to new occupations instead of being adapted to suit existing ones. We must abandon the traditional idea that learning is a boring and dreary business. Only a teaching system which is enjoyable and creates a desire to learn can give people a taste for widening and updating their knowledge constantly, and allow them to keep pace with the transformation of society.

EDUCATION AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY

The technological development of society affects man not only in his outward and visible behavior and his manner of living, but also in his inner being. It faces him with new problems, creates new hazards, and calls for new efforts.

Man will therefore undergo a transformation in himself; first he will have to overcome his fears and anxieties, in particular the present-day fear of intellectual overproduction which is at the origin of our University Malthusianism.

Subsequently, all the educational possibilities of modern technology must be made use of—for example video tapes, individual teaching programmed on computers, and so on.

Man must keep up with the times if he is not to be slaved to the technological society.

A NEW CONCEPTION OF CULTURE

The current changes in culture, which is becoming a culture for the masses, have been violently attacked by intellectuals. For the conservatives, mass culture is merely dulling and stupefying; it is a degrading and degraded culture. For the left-wingers, culture can only be an alienating influence, the expression of a reviled bourgeois society.

It is obvious that we are faced here with a double risk. But it is debatable whether this evolution will lead to such a negative result. The present-day creative vogue shows that the creators do not seek to flatter the baser instincts of the public. The appreciation of works of art continues to be a hard and demanding task. In the communist society, on the other hand, painting and literature are conventional and boring. All the more reason for thinking that in our technological society new cultural values are being added to the old ones, by the very nature of science and technology. Moreover, present-day reproduction techniques and mass communications systems bring this culture to a very great number of people. It is a mistake to imagine that this mass dissemination necessarily brings about uniformity and conformism; on the contrary, the current trend is towards diversity and non-conformism.

If these obvious facts do not strike the conservatives, it is because they systematically refuse to consider culture in its new form. They are petrified in the unchanging traditions of their childhood.

Such resistance was not seriously harmful as long as knowledge developed only slowly. But nowadays, it tends to arrest the progress of teaching and to neglect the constant advance of science and the transformations which this imposes on the arts. Science and technology are the main targets of the conservatives' scorn. Their contempt is based on a distinction between "noble" studies and others which they consider to be inferior. This ancient distinction results in the last analysis in millions of square pegs in round holes—people who have missed their vocation.

This disregard of technology is all the more serious in that the need for technical education is growing and will continue to grow.

The qualifications of today will be the under-qualifications of tomorrow. What is more, we have here a source of conflict between youth and the older generation; the most redoutable of the new myths are upheld by students who are rich in literary and classical training but who are completely ignorant of the technological world at which their criticisms are aimed.

The fact is that the process of reestablishing communication between society and its critics must be started in the infant and primary schools, where the child must be trained to make the effort of thought necessary to understand the world in which it lives. This is all the more necessary in that boys and girls must be taught discernment in handling the mass of information communicated to them by modern methods. Conversely, a great deal of knowledge which was formerly thought indispensable no longer corresponds to present-day culture, and its teaching is a waste of time. One expression of all this is the belief that knowledge must be divided up into arbitrary compartments, or disciplines. But modern research has shown that the sciences are fertilized by the arts, and vice versa. Of course, this is also true of the professions, as is seen for example in the role of psychology in medicine. Yet there are many

gaps in the training of executives and professional men and women as well as of teachers themselves. More generally speaking, training today calls for a constant ability to update and broaden one's knowledge, and hence it calls for the ability to handle general ideas. Even if he is a specialist, the man of today must not confine himself to being a devotee of a single discipline. Modern teaching cannot accept the premise of a petrified culture.

A NEW APPROACH TO THINKING

If we hope to master the technical evolution of our day, it is not sufficient for modern man to know and understand technology. He must also acquire the technological approach, that is to say the ability of passing from theoretical knowledge to practical application and vice versa. This is bound up with the three revolutions which have already been referred to: the industrial revolution, the revolution in communications, and the computer revolution.

The future development of the industrial revolution will mean that we shall have to control rather than produce; react to possible difficulties rather than merely act. Another way of thinking must emerge—a more universal one, capable of rapidly calling upon accumulated knowledge. In this connection, the development of mathematics is of capital importance.

The instantaneous transmission of information, especially through mass media, poses the problem of the extraordinary imbalance between the mental functions of transmitting and receiving. Formerly, each of us spoke and listened. Today, the speaker and the listener are no longer on an equal basis. We are besieged by the transmission, and the combat is an unequal one.

But it is not a desperate one, provided that we learn how to use the transistor and the television set as instruments of liberation. For this to be so, those responsible for broadcasting stations must cease using them as instruments of political or economic conditioning; they must make use of all their educational potentialities. It also implies that, from their youngest age, children must be taught not just to receive what is transmitted to them, but to exercise the necessary choice and judgement.

In addition, in order to achieve a certain balance between transmission and reception in every-day life, man must learn to express himself. All forms of expression must be encouraged, particularly artistic expression. As the example of Japan shows, success is possible, but in order to achieve it we must avoid compressing things into a prefabricated mould. It is not sufficient to protect childrens' faculties of expression. The new man must be in a position to participate with greater authority and greater influence in the decisions which concern him—hence the need for joint decisions between teachers and the people they teach.

As for the computer revolution, this also creates a very important problem for educators who are thinking ahead to the year 2000 or 2010. We must be able to communicate with the machine; but it does not use the same language as we do, and we have to make a considerable effort to achieve the same precision in our thinking.

For example, every problem must be conceived by defining the purpose of the operation. Teaching must adopt such a procedure, even if only for simple general knowledge lessons.

NEW PATTERNS OF LIVING

Looking ahead to tomorrow's technological society, we may predict the development of some contradictions and consider how education can help to resolve them.

The first contradiction is between the models which we propose to young people and their feeling that we leave them no choice. But everyone wants to choose his own objectives and his own destiny, and the development of mass education is accompanied by the need for a form of personalized education. The school and the University therefore have to teach not only the possibility of freedom, but its use also. In this connection, the new role of pupils and students is an essential one; but no less important is that of their teachers. The latter must not be mere dispensers of knowledge or distillers of curricula, they must propose aims and expose themselves to possible contestation.

The second contradiction is between the increasing tribalization of society and its deep-rooted need for communication. Technology certainly does not generate uniformity, nor does the school generate unity. On the contrary, the number of water-tight compartments increases while individuals are starved of human relationships and true contacts, as is reflected by all the reactions manifested in recent times.

Teaching must remedy this first of all by an effort to restore communication, and teachers will have to try to understand and seek common languages. Moreover, we must abandon the selective system of individual advancement, which ruthlessly eliminates the less privileged before they have begun life, in favor of collective advancement, which attempts to eliminate nobody and to allow all citizens to enter life with the same chances. This corresponds to the trend in big, modern companies where the joint action of complementary forces, the matching of abilities, and team spirit take precedence—as reflected in the tremendous changes that have occurred between the time of Alexander and the epoch of Apollo XI.

The third contradiction, and perhaps the major one, arises between what has been called the technostructure of our States and the mass of citizens.

In human terms, it is the conflict between the technocratic masters of the future and those who have to submit to their decisions in order to survive. Here there lies a considerable risk for all societies which allow power to be concentrated in the hands of a few men because they possess knowledge, in spite of a widespread desire for democracy.

The possibility of participation demands first and foremost a reorganization of our educational system, because it is the educators who will be decisive in determining whether men learn or do not learn to understand one another, to make themselves understood, to have their aspirations shared yet to abandon some of their aspirations in favor of the aspirations of others, and to reach joint decisions on their common problems. None of this comes naturally to man. Modern democracy will only be achieved if we are all determined not to leave the choice of the common destiny to the State technostructure, but to take an active part in it.

A renovated education is therefore the price which we must pay today in order to live in the technological society of tomorrow. But the transformations in education which appear to be necessary are not conceived merely to change man's position by giving him the means of achieving his ambitions. Their effect will be to change man himself. Will we succeed in achieving this improvement, comparable to a biogenetic process? If we do, man will not necessarily be the master of the society of tomorrow. But if we do not succeed, he is certain to be its slave.

DISCUSSION

The discussion of this item of the agenda was opened by some preliminary observations by the author of the British working paper and by two compatriots of the other authors.[1]

The French participant who replaced the author of the French working paper reminded the meeting that the administration of human affairs was in the course of profound change. For centuries, it had been based entirely on the powers and responsibilities of decision-makers. Under these conditions, higher education could be reserved for an élite. Nowadays, he said, there is a confrontation—sometimes violent—of ideas at all levels. Some social groups are deeply concerned at the transformations which are necessary, or judged to be so. In this context, the generalization of the dialogue assumes increasing importance; the University must take on a new aspect, and three questions

1. The author of the French working paper was prevented from attending the beginning of the discussion. The author of the American working paper was detained in his country for personal reasons.

arise: must the University be open to everyone, or only to an elite? Must it accept only adolescents, or should it admit men and women of all ages? Is its purpose to transmit knowledge or to help man to become mature?

The author of the British working paper remarked that it was preferable to set aside problems of University organization or management, and to deal rather with the "product"—namely graduates, for whom the University exists. He suggested that the meeting discuss the following questions, already touched upon in the working papers:

To whom is the University responsible?

Who is to be taught? (and, in particular, how can the University be at one and the same time "popular" and "élitist", nurturing future innovators in an egalitarian society?)

What is to be taught? (Professional education is already satisfactory, considered the speaker, but specialized competence is only a minor ingredient in decision-making).

Who is to teach? (And how to preserve research, an indispensable element?)

How is teaching to be programmed in relation to time?

An American participant, who also holds a University post, emphasized the pressure in favor of the admission of an increasing number of students. This may be interpreted as the response to the needs of the modern economy, but it poses the problem of financing, and of the disastrous results which inadequate funds may entail.

An even more tricky question is the balance between the objectives of the University and the needs of society, notably in respect of teaching priorities. Recent events have led to an awareness of these problems, even though certain excessive acts have discredited the student cause. Knowledge, pointed out the speaker, is above teaching itself, and nothing can replace the will to learn.

The speaker also remarked that the idea that rationality is at the basis of our Universities is a relatively recent assumption. As for the role of Universities where research is concerned, it must not be forgotten that their contribution in this respect is relatively slight.

* * *

In the discussion proper, several speakers referred to the agitation and malaise which have recently been a feature of University life, but most of them, rather than bringing up the transitory or anecdotal aspects of the subject, concentrated on defining certain permanent traits likely to have a lasting influence—either positive or negative—on the University of tomorrow.

According to a British participant, who expressed himself optimistic about

the future, students desire self-fulfillment more than anything else; they want to be able to make decisions themselves rather than allow themselves to be influenced by others. When intelligent students feel that they cannot act on their environment, there is a regression. Similar views were expressed by two Canadian participants. The first thought that students rejected society, but were not too sure what to put in its place. The second added that the materialistic and technological image of our society was such as to dishearten students, who also noted our incapacity to master certain problems arising out of this technology (notably problems of the environment). Moreover, added an American participant, we have given a bad example—at least in the USA—by tackling the most vital questions twenty years too late, when violence has already done its work and the activists seem to have more success than the advocates of a rational approach.

But, as an Icelandic participant pointed out, violence is no new phenomenon; what is new is the scale on which it occurs (although even this has been somewhat exaggerated by some), even though it does not take place in a revolutionary situation. This brings out the separation between the University and society, a point which was touched upon by numerous speakers.

The University cannot remain an ivory tower, stated a British participant, especially if we accept the fact that education must be destined for all generations. The speaker said that he was personally in favor of a total fusion between the University and society, the first stage of which could be achieved by a multiplication of contacts. Referring to the students themselves, an American speaker pointed out that in the present-day world it was almost impossible for them not to be "political". But, he said, it is important to give them practical experience before they set out on their definitive path, even if this concrete social activity means that some of them leave the University. In support of this argument, the speaker cited the example of brilliant American students who had themselves felt such a need. Another American participant considered that many students in his country are in need of therapy; their attitude indicates a sort of lassitude, an impossibility of associating themselves with the concrete needs of society, and this leads them to hold society in question. The University can help them to avoid channeling this desire for change along undesirable lines. Paradoxically, said the speaker, in order to make the University more human it is necessary to create certain activities which do not make University attendance indispensable.

But, in the opinion of a French participant, if society is divorced from the University, it may be because we ourselves consider the future of the world as being exclusively cultural (the University as the image of this future world), thereby neglecting its physical and sociological bases, which may be firm

enough. In this connection, the speaker remarked that in the eyes of the workers the student movement forms part of the tactics of the trade unions but not of their strategy. Moreover, as a British participant and a Norwegian participant pointed out, certain reactions against student violence originated among the ordinary masses. However this may be, stated a Turkish participant, this emotional impact must be left out of consideration when we discuss the future, and it is difficult to reply categorically in the affirmative or in the negative when we speak of possible frontiers between the University and society.

The influx of students in the Universities was referred to by very many speakers, some of them from the analytical angle but most of them in the light of the controversy between the "masses" and the "élite". Correlatively, this poses the problem of the ultimate purpose of the University. Several participants examined this question from the point of view of solutions to be adopted; this point will be dealt with later.

The influx of young people into the University, said one of the American participants already quoted, may be interpreted as corresponding to the economic needs of society. Alternatively, one of his compatriots stated energetically, it may be interpreted as corresponding to a myth, carefully nurtured by the graduates themselves, of the value of higher education.

One of the first problems raised by this influx lies in the fact that countries' resources in men and money are not unlimited. According to a Swedish participant, who supported his remarks with statistics relating to his country, this is not an insurmountable obstacle. But, asked several speakers, even apart from purely financial considerations, is there not a risk of the quality of teaching being sacrificed to quantity? (In this connection, an American speaker reminded the meeting that the growing importance of the teaching of women in the future was not to be neglected either).

Like the author of the British working paper, many participants came out in favor of the coexistence of the University of the masses and a more thorough teaching reserved for the most gifted students (the "popular" University and the "élite" University). A Belgian speaker summed up this point of view by emphasizing that the two concepts were not contradictory; on the one hand admission to the University must be open to all who wish to enter (and in this respect we must not consider technical teaching to be a second class domain); on the other hand, a modern culture must be dispensed, and the ratio between teachers and taught must be increased so far as is possible. Furthermore, we must always take care that the most brilliant students come to the top ("safeguard the road to the Nobel prize"). An Italian participant, supporting this point of view, noted that the number of gifted individuals did not increase in proportion to University attendance. The confusion between the gifted and

the less gifted gives rise to frustration—and to collectivism which we see at the present time—while it is important to select and encourage individuals capable of assuming responsibilities and making decisions in later life. An American participant also expressed his concern at the concept of mass education insofar as it risks leading to a levelling down. One of the French participants already quoted echoed this and said that he was afraid that facility within the University would lead the technical and industrial society to create its own training systems and to select its executives from outside the University system.

The idea of an élite itself was the subject of animated discussion. One American participant went so far as to propose the elimination of this term because of the bad connotations most often attached to it. Without rejecting this concept, several participants—notably a British speaker and an international speaker—opposed "élitism" as a dominant principle of teaching. We must not, declared the latter, consider the arrival of the masses at the University with resignation; on the contrary, we must see great cause for hope in it. And when we speak of the inflation of degrees, we may ask ourselves whether this is not an instrument for creating jobs. Moreover, opinion among young people no longer accepts the crystallisation between an extended training of more or less University type and the training of an élite cut off from the masses. In this connection, an American participant considered that the younger generation in his country was not particularly sensitive to this problem, so long as they have a minimum stock of knowledge and can see a rising tide of egalitarianism in professional and public life. Another American speaker, referring to the experience of colored people in his country, stressed the primarily utilitarian nature of education and its role in equalizing human conditions.

The principle of the selection of élites by and within the University was held in question by some participants.

In addition to the speakers already quoted, an international participant and two American speakers emphasized that the University must offer all candidates the possibility of achieving self-development in the light of their capabilities, avoid eliminating gifted minds, and allow a sort of natural process of emergence of the élite, in all cases rejecting any idea of self-perpetuation. This supposes improved methods of education, if necessary not hesitating to have recourse to practical experience.

Taking account of all these facts, the meeting devoted a large part of its discussions to the relevance of the University to the needs of society—a question posed by the American working paper. Many participants concentrated on setting forth clearly the major objectives which might be assigned to the University.

Does the University correspond to the needs of society? In attempting to reply to this question, an American participant considered that what the University needed was something more rather than something different. True, it is a good thing that the University should face up to concrete problems such as housing, pollution, etc.; but an empirical approach to these problems must not on that account bring them down to a level at which a sharper intellectual approach is excluded. In point of fact, many speakers took this intellectual approach is excluded. In point of fact, many speakers took this opportunity of stating the need for increased diversification, greater flexibility of teaching, and of student options. As a Norwegian participant remarked, this search for relevance of the University must not be interpreted from the narrow utilitarian angle. The rapid change affecting societies and techniques must lead us to concentrate our efforts on suitable means of stimulating the independance, creativity and adaptability of human minds. The various technical options, in the opinion of an American participant, must remain open; and in particular it is a bad thing to impose certain curricula and certain examinations on students (this point was also taken up later in the discussion by another American speaker). We ourselves, pointed out an international participant, have a view of this question which is too traditionally unitarian, since we always think of "the University", whereas its pluralistic vocation has steadily grown in recent years and must continue to grow if we wish to give the mass of young people who want to enter the University the possibility of achieving all their aspirations (and to constitute the true élite of the future, not the élite in the traditional sense, and still less the "establishment" of tomorrow).

In this connection some participants—and notably a Norwegian speaker and an American speaker—energetically defended the cause of general culture and the classical humanities which, they said, must not disappear under the rising tide of technology, but which on the contrary are now assuming greater value. A similar argument was developed by a Belgian participant (taking up an idea raised in the French working paper) in favor of the fine arts and media of expression which, he said, can greatly contribute to human happiness.

Conversely, but without adopting the opposite view to the one just expressed, some participants emphasized the value of technology and specialization from the University stage onwards. An Icelandic participant, already quoted, stressed in this connection that the present-day critical attitude of students to technology takes little account of the fact that it is indeed technology which makes their studies possible! A Turkish participant pointed out that at the University stage (not to be confused with education in general) a certain degree of specialization is inevitable. On this subject, an American participant contested the statement of the author of the British working paper that special-

ized teaching is already satisfactory at the present time. On the basis of his own experience in security affairs, another American speaker emphasized that the world of tomorrow is likely to be highly complex; in order to be able to take account of all the different interacting factors a wide range of skills will be increasingly necessary, and it would be a pity if the University could not provide them. This view was echoed by a third American speaker who at the beginning of the discussion had quoted some examples of specialized teaching. This, he said, is even more true for research, which is an essential function of the University. Other participants took up this last subject. "Will research remain compatible with the University of the masses"?, asked an international participant. An American participant expressed the hope that University centres devoted to research would not be side-tracked by more general discussions outside their own discipline and would continue to receive substantial financial resources for research.

In the light of these considerations, several speakers expressed in general terms their conception of the role and objectives of the University in modern society and in the society of tomorrow. Rather than seeing the University as being slanted on the students themselves, as suggested by the author of the British working paper, a Norwegian participant preferred to define the University as a community of professors and students oriented towards the search for truth in all fields of reality, with this conception inspiring both teaching and research itself. A French participant assigned teaching a threefold mission; the transmission of knowledge, the formation of character and intelligence, and integration of the student into society. The first objective, he said, must not be underestimated; this transmission must be general, open to cultural as well as scientific realities. On the second point, the aim is to inculcate methods of thinking rather than scholastic knowledge (this point was taken up energetically later in the discussion by a Dutch participant and a Canadian participant). In the third place, young people must be taught to work in groups in order to solve the real problems of the modern world. A Norwegian participant pointed out also that the University may play the role of supreme arbiter on certain problems on which politicians and even experts may be divided. This is why it is so important that the University should not allow itself to be dominated by small groups with marked political tendencies. An American participant assigned the University five main objectives: (a) seeking the truth; (b) helping the student to know himself and to excercise his mind; (c) giving him historical and ethical perspectives; (d) involving him in real and lasting problems; (e) making him a good citizen in the widest sense of that term. Normally, he remarked, the University can achieve only one or two of these objectives, but this is precisely what brings out the need

for a diversification of types of education. An international participant considered that the role of the University comprised two main functions, namely the transmission of knowledge and intellectual training; but he pointed out that the University plays a unique and irreplaceable role in the former field, whereas it does not in the second. It would even be misleading to see the University as the natural training ground for leaders.

In the light of the problems facing the University and the objectives to be assigned to it, several participants attempted to single out concrete reforms or guidelines which might be adopted.

At the beginning of the discussion, a Belgian participant had put forward certain suggestions drawn from the work of ten or so working groups set up in 1965 in his country under the aegis of the "Industry University" foundation. These suggestions related to the increasing number of students, the process of learning, and the involvement of the University in the study of the concrete problems of society.

On the first point, the tendancy in Europe up to the present, said the speaker, has been to limit expansion. This Malthusian attitude must be abandoned; it should be possible to make a selection which is not an exclusion but a reorientation which, for various but convergent reasons, must be made within the institution itself. To this end, the latter must be able to provide both high level University teaching and technical teaching with a more concrete slant.

With regard to the process of learning, continued the speaker, it is time that we took account of the latest advances in psychology and used all the resources of electronics. Since the most powerful agent of training is the individual himself, it is his motivation for learning which must be developed first and foremost. Moreover, there should be a symbiosis between life itself and the place of learning. In particular, we must examine under what conditions the system of higher education itself can produce services, and also how the system of production of goods and services—both public and private—can become a system of education. From this angle, the role of the teaching institution and of the teachers becomes that of a counsellor, helper, guide and mediator between the developing human being (whether young or adult) and his environment.

On the third point, the speaker expressed the wish that the University should involve professors and students on a large scale in the study and implementing of projects to improve the administration of human affairs.

A French participant, who wanted to see the myth of the University as a social jumping-off point disappear, wondered what would be the financial cost of measures aimed at doing away with the traditional distinction between primary teaching, secondary teaching and the first stage of University teaching

and replacing these by a single school which could be attended by all young people up to the age of 18 or 19. They could then be given practical experience of the type referred to by an American participant, after which they would be ready to choose their career in life—and for some of them this could mean undergoing specialized courses of training. Such a solution, said the speaker, would perhaps be less costly for the community than the mass of students at present trailing through the Universities up to the age of 25 or 26.

With regard to teachers themselves, an American participant was in favor of abolishing their titles and professorships, which he considered a cause of immobility in the subjects taught. Similar views were expressed later in the discussion by an international participant, who called the function of professors, as it is at present conceived, "clerical" or "ecclesial". He wanted them to be recruited in a more diversified manner in the future, including the possibility of "borrowing" temporarily from the outside world. Moreover, he said, we must employ the men available more rationally, more effectively, and more flexibly.

An American participant suggested that present University curricula be modified and made more flexible, including more interdisciplinary seminars from the first year onwards and encouraging pre-University communal experiences or, failing that, undertakings during the long vacations.

An Italian speaker suggested a few guidelines which would make it possible to resolve the contradiction which might arise—as the discussion had shown—between individual selection and collective advancement, even though general agreement seemed to be emerging on the role played by qualified teams in modern society. Taking up this last point—already referred to by a French participant—the speaker wondered whether it was not possible to form, at an early stage of the educational process, working teams who would be assigned tasks in place of those which ordinarily fall to individuals. These teams would be formed spontaneously, on the basis of "elective affinities", and the teachers would give them impetus rather than impose their views upon them. A feeling of common purpose would arise, and the selection judged necessary would be applied to the teams themselves. The best individuals would naturally emerge from the best teams.

A German participant emphasized that the University of tomorrow must involve itself more in the economic, technical and scientific world. To this end, cooperative project-oriented undertakings should be encouraged, especially on the international scale, involving governments, industry and scientific circles, special care being taken to preserve the necessary independence of the University (this objective could be attained by submitting these projects to public discussion by those concerned).

Most of the participants stressed the value which they attached, like the authors of the working papers, to further education and to the contribution which leaders of industry might make to teaching. An Italian orator developed some observations on these two points. The question arises, he said, as to how men who have already reached a fairly high position in their companies and who may be considered as the leaders of tomorrow can be freed from their jobs and "recycled" to the University for two or three years without affecting the running of their companies or their own careers. This is easier in the case of big companies which are widely dispersed geographically, for they are better able to replace people who are temporarily detached in this way and they are also better able to reintegrate them into the company subsequently. Conversely, it presents great difficulties for small firms.

The contribution of leaders of business and industry to University teaching is certainly an exciting possibility. The only doubt in the speaker's mind was whether the intelligence and experience of certain business men were coupled in all cases with the qualities of congeniality, human contact, or simply "acceptability" indispensable to the dialogue between young and old, particularly in the climate prevailing today.

A Belgian participant expressed the wish that the University concern itself more with the first steps of its students in professional life, notably through contacts with employers and with the State. This follow-up could moreover lead to continuing on-the-job training. The same speaker emphasized the European importance of this question, European Universities having remained, he said, too conservative, too protectionist and too nationalist, as reflected in the failure to create the European University planned under the Treaty of Rome.

Another Belgian participant drew the attention of the meeting to the "Europe 2000" project, currently being implemented by the European cultural foundation and which covers some of the subjects dealt with in the present discussion.

Before closing the discussion on this item of the agenda, the President called upon the two authors of working papers who were present to make some final remarks.

The author of the French working paper first put forward five basic propositions:
—The sum total of knowledge today is greater than previously.
—There are also more people to receive it.
—Both masses continue to increase.
—The purpose of teaching nowadays is to learn how to learn and not to receive ready-made knowledge, for there is too much of the latter to be

memorized, and moreover memorization can be assigned to machines. The first four propositions, said the speaker, may be applied in a purely economic conception of society. The fifth proposition goes beyond this; the main demand is for training—the fulfillment, or even the revelation, of the personality. And if we want an individual to be able to participate fully in society—as conceived in the doctrine of General de Gaulle—he must have a fully developed personality.

Modern pedagogy give us the possibility of going beyond the idea of there being gifted children and less gifted ones. In point of fact, there is more talent than we think, notably among the masses.

The second possibility, which occurs after infant school, is to utilize everything that can be classed as motivation, especially in a system of teaching which succeeds in breaking down the compartments between "literary" and "scientific" and "technical". Moreover, we must not neglect the possibilities offered, at advantageous cost, by programmed teaching.

The speaker supported the idea of a generalized higher education put forward by the author of the British working paper. This, he said, should be conceived quite apart from any guarantee of employment. The great mistake is to believe that the University produces the degree and that the degree produces jobs. We must break the link between culture and employment (moreover, if we have an adequate level of culture, the individual may more easily find employment, and even have a choice of jobs). Even the person who performs a menial routine task has the right to be intelligent, to receive an education sufficient for him to understand the world in which he lives and to exercise his rights as a citizen.

We must succeed in integrating the University with life by all possible means (some of them have been referred to at this meeting); the terms "élite" and "selection" are not pleasant and neither are the conceptions they embody. We must do away with the preconceived distinction between the élite and the masses. The situation can be better grasped if we have recourse to the notions of specialization, vocation, teamwork, and certain qualities such as character and decision, which have no relation with culture. Moreover, talent can be developed all through life.

The criticism aimed at the society which is developing is directed at all the advanced countries; we must accept discussion with the revolutionaries, and we must even oblige them to engage in it. For example, when faced with proposals aimed at arresting expansion, we all tend to be Marxists, considering man uniquely as a producer. We must see man as a non-producer, give him satisfactions in other fields, and create a model of the developing society which integrates the need for expansion—in other words, we must solve the problem

not from the angle of the "manipulators" but from the angle of the people who are manipulated. All advanced liberal countries should cooperate to build this model on a human basis; the greatest advancement compatible with the personality, notably through education—total and continuous.

The author of the British working paper presented his remarks[1] as a sort of "examiner's report" on the replies submitted to the questions which he had raised in his paper. He began by regretting that no one had made any remarks on one of these questions: to whom is the University responsible? How is it, asked the speaker, that such a galaxy of personalities is not interested in this problem, notably the American participants, whose country spends 2% of its gross national product on higher education? This problem is basic for government policies concerning the financing of education. We must realize its consequences.

Responsible to its "clients"? On the European side of the Atlantic, the United States are considered to be the consumer's paradise, the consumer being the supreme judge of purchasing criteria. If we regard the student as such, the University is responsible to him, and we may then consider offering him his studies at a realistic cost and letting him shop around among the various types of education available, the University itself receiving nothing. Some groups in the United States and in the United Kingdom are seriously considering such a solution, and this would not be so very new, for in the 19th century the students themselves provided the Scottish Universities with 3/4 of their revenue.

Responsible to the "users of the product"? Here we have the "manpower" aspect of the question from the employers' point of view, and the problem is seen in this way in the U.S.S.R. This implies a control of grants, which are allocated in the light of the studies pursued. For example, in the United Kingdom, it has been recognized that the development of the country necessitates that two-thirds of students study science and technology, and one-third study the arts. But the real proportion is 50/50. We could modify it by a suitable adjustment of grants, since 95% of British students are grant-aided. But we do not do so because we do not consider the University to be responsible to users of its products.

Responsible to those which finance it? This would mean parliamentary control, and this is dangerous unless it is limited, for one of the essential functions of the University resides in a logical and reasoned criticism of society and of the government. The powers of the financing authority must therefore be carefully limited.

1. These remarks were made at the beginning of Sunday morning, April 19, before the continuation of the discussion of the second item on the agenda.

Responsible to itself? We may note that no major change in Universities in the United Kingdom has ever been introduced without the outside intervention of a Royal Commission. Professors are intelligent people, but most of them are not very good at making political and social decisions.

The speaker then touched upon the question of mass education versus élitism. He expressed satisfaction at the excellent contribution made by the discussions. In 1970, he stated, by comparison with the situation prevailing a century ago it would be just as absurd to limit the possibilities of education beyond the secondary level as it would be to close the door completely to further education to school leavers. Mass education, further education—and this can be at the University itself—are with us, prefiguring further education throughout the whole of life. A first step in this direction can be the University open to students of all ages, as are museums and libraries—just as further education is already made available, notably in the U.S.S.R., in factories and offices. The financial problem can be solved. The affluent countries can organize a full-time education, and the less affluent can have recourse to evening classes, occasional days off, correspondence course, and television.

But it is important to call this "further education" because a nation which is not capable of organizing its education as a series of filters, with the possibility *for those who are capable of it* of receiving a much more rigorous and costly higher education, is headed for disaster. The homogenization of all further education in a single mould would ruin the whole system and lead to a levelling down, as shown by the various examples of Indian and African Universities.

True, the word "élite" can give rise to misunderstanding. But the speaker urged that it be retained. If we consider, he remarked, that the education of juvenile delinquents costs more than Eton, to deny similar attention to above-normal minds would be inverted snobbery. This necessitates a very high ratio of teachers to students, but can one imagine an aircraft pilot trained by mass education in a class of 500 students?

Having said this, went on the speaker, we must leave the door open to further education after leaving school and throughout the whole of life (adult education could provide a good subject for another Bilderberg meeting), in view of the fact that part of the system can be safeguarded for the benefit of very gifted students. Must further education and higher education be taught in different institutions? Certainly not. Students may share the same central heating and the same cafeteria, differentiation occurring at the classroom doors.

But how is this élite to be selected? It will, in fact, select itself. The speaker cited as an example the violinist Menuhin who accepts as pupils gifted individuals who say that they are ready to work 5 hours a day. If such a selection is élitist, it is certainly justifiable!

But the snobbery of the educational system is due to something else, namely a superfluous activity from which employers derive profit. The principal function of the University is to train people to think rationally and to reduce ignorance; but the University does two other things: it confers degrees (for the public) and classes of degrees (for the convenience of employers). In the past, only the Chinese Mandarinate system worked this way. The practice of classing degrees into first, second, third, etc., should be optional, and reserved for those who are prepared to make a long and special effort—as was the case at Oxford and Cambridge in the nineteenth century—for this generalized system implies that the University is inseparable from competition, and this is what understandably irritates students.

We must not demand too much of the universities. Their organization and their staff allow them to deal with problems properly through rational thought and logical analysis, but not by other means. True, this is only one part of education. Irrational activities predominate in the art of living, even if only in love and marriage!

Are other activities possible?

Social action: this is extremely important. Students must engage in it, but we cannot ask the University to make it a degree subject.

Self-expression (spontaneous activity, living theatre, etc.): certainly, but in spare time.

Character and morals: it is necessary, of course, to build character, but there are no professors of character-building! In point of fact the whole teaching process carries its moral content within it.

The petrification of curricula is a danger. In former times we could expect universities to provide a common core of culture, a common language. This is no longer the case. The fragmentation of culture is a fact of our times. But perhaps we can find a certain unity in a training which allows us to make a common approach to the solution of major social problems.

ITEM II

PRIORITIES IN FOREIGN POLICY

The groundwork for discussion of this item consisted of a paper concerning "Young Americans' attitudes towards foreign policy for the 1970's" prepared by an American participant.

SUMMARY OF AND INTRODUCTION TO
THE AMERICAN WORKING PAPER

The paper commences with a Harris Poll quiz dated May 1969 in which 1200 Americans of all ages were asked whether they would favour sending US troops to the support of respectively, Thailand, Italy, West Berlin and Israel, in case they were invaded by communist military forces; the affirmative answers to these questions are (in that same order) as follows: 25%, 27%, 26% and 9%.

The author feels that from the perspective of the year 2000, historians will conclude that in the quarter century after World War II the predominant change in the distribution of international power was caused by the expansion of American economic, political and cultural influence.

This expansion was primarily affected by two major developments: on the one hand by the decline of European influence in Asia, Africa and even Latin America, on the other hand by the communist threat to the independence of nations around the globe. In both instances the US rejoinder was so obviously defensive, that few Americans appreciated the scope of the US commitment. Nevertheless, 25 years after the end of World War II, the United States found itself, more by default than design, an imperial power.

"Imperium Americana" has demonstrated the following four differences when compared to the traditional meaning of the word "empire": first, the United States has rarely insisted on direct political control of the affairs of its host countries or client states; second, the United States has been unique in its extent of rather selfless, idealistic commitment to the maintenance of international order, generation of economic growth and encouragement of democratic government; third, the American empire has arisen in an era of dramatic increases in national power and independence. Its size is, therefore, no measure of its influence relative to previous empires; fourth, the basic guidelines of

post-war American foreign policy were forged by a relatively few individuals who succeeded in gaining the support of most American citizens for their policies.

That this American empire is becoming a thing of the past is the central hypothesis of the paper. The author speculates that historians of the year 2000 might regard US "retraction" as the predominant change in the distribution of international power during the last three decades of this century.

Reasons for this envisaged retraction of power might be the following:

a. The depth of the present disenchantment with policies of the past. (In this context the poll at the beginning of this paper is, to a certain extent, cited.) The broad bipartisan consensus that characterized American foreign policy for two decades after World War II has, at present, given way to widespread bipartisan confusion;

b. The probable course of international events in the 1970's and thereafter— a large number of plausible sequences of events are consistent with a considerable withdrawal of American power;

c. The attitudes of young Americans today towards foreign policy in the 1970's.

As its title already indicates, the principal task of this paper is to deal with this last consideration—to be more specific, it purports to answer the question as to what the *deeper* attitudes of the 25-34 year old *very elite* Americans are towards foreign policy *at the beginning of the 1970's.*

A SHORT ANSWER

The current priorities of young Americans are, with the notable exception of Viet Nam, predominantly *not* issues of foreign policy. Rather, today the objects of the greatest concern are overwhelmingly domestic: i.e. the poor, the Blacks, the cities, the environment, law and order, the quality of American life.

To the extent that foreign policy is currently important to young Americans, they would be more inclined to "cool" foreign affairs; in other words, they would wish Viet Nam to be over, defence budgets to be slashed, and international entanglements to be cut.

A LONGER ANSWER

Young American's attitudes towards foreign policy today are defined in large part as challenges to, and questions about the following axioms that seem to have governed American foreign policy in the post-war era. (These axioms are stated starkly and are, therefore, of necessity a caricature; but a caricature can be instructive.)

AXIOMS OF THE POST-WAR ERA

1. The pre-eminent feature of international politics is the conflict between communism and the free world.

2. The surest simple guide to US interests in foreign policy is opposition to communism.

3. Communism is on the march.
   a. Communist governments are rising and Western democracies may be declining. When will the Soviet Union overtake the US in economic and military strength?
   b. Soviet intentions vis-à-vis Western Europe are essentially aggressive.
   c. The main source of unrest, disorder, subversion, and civil war in underdeveloped areas is communist influence and support.

4. Communism is monolithic.
   a. Communism has some unique adhesive quality that can paste over national and ethnic differences.
   b. Since the communist bloc is cohesive, every nation that falls to communism increases the power of the communist bloc in its struggle with the free world.

5. The US has the power, responsibility and right to defend the free world and maintain international order.

6. Peace is indivisible. Therefore, collective defence is necessary. The new international order will be based primarily on US assumption of responsibility, especially in demonstrating US willingness to resist aggression.

7. The Third World really matters.
   a. It is the battle ground between communism and the free world.
   b. Western capital will generate economic development and political stability with a minimum of violence.
   c. Instability is the great threat to progress in the Third World.

8. The US can play an important role in inducing European integration which will, in some unspecified manner, solve the German problem.

9. Military strength is the primary route to national security.
   a. Nuclear war is a serious possibility.
   b. Nuclear proliferation is a certain road to disaster.

10. While the US has many domestic needs, the first order of business is US national security, which is closely linked with the security of the free world.

These axioms were in more or less sophisticated versions widely believed, and for 25 years after World War II American foreign policy was (roughly) consistent with these propositions as guidelines. Against this background parts

of President John F. Kennedy's Inaugural Address (January 21, 1966), that set the tone of us foreign policy for the last decade, are quoted.

Today young Americans question every one of the aforementioned propositions, and many would go further to assert the contrary of each. The following axioms of young Americans are submitted as as a broad-brush caricature and are stated in a stark and summary fashion as were the axioms of the older generation.

AXIOMS OF YOUNG AMERICANS

1. While there are crucial differences between communist and democratic regimes, the distinction between communism and the Free World is not the critical divide.

2. Opposition to communism is a misleading guide for us foreign policy.
   a. To the extent that the us has legitimate foreign policy objectives, they are not summarized by the term "anti-communist".
   b. Why is communist Cuba worse than "free" Haiti or Greece?

3. The Soviet Union is an established, status quo oriented power.
   a. Future relations between the us and the Soviet Union will be characterized by negotiations, co-operation and convergence of interests.

4. Nationalism is stronger than communism.
   a. If North Viet Nam captured Southeast Asia, would she be a greater or lesser threat to China?
   b. If communist China captured India, would China be a greater or lesser threat to the us?

5. The us has neither the power, nor the responsibility, nor the right to guarantee the defence of the Free World.
   a. In the Third World, military involvement is more dangerous than military isolation.
   b. What right does the us have to be supporting and enforcing its concept of what is good for other nations?
   c. The us should reconsider all obligations to defend other nations.

6. Peace is divisible.

7. What could happen in Latin America, Africa, or Asia (with the possible exception of Japan) that could affect the security or vital interests of the United States?
   a. No foreseeable objective in the Third World could justify the expenditure of 40.000 American lives and $ 100 billion.
   b. Wars, revolution, and violence are inevitable in many parts of the world and will be necessary elements in economic and political development.

8. Europe has recovered and should now assume primary responsibility for its own problems, including defence.

9. Increasing military strength will only bring increased national insecurity.
   a. Strategic "superiority" is meaningless.
   b. Nuclear war is incredible.
   c. Nuclear proliferation may be inevitable.

10. A number of pressing domestic requirements should have priority over all current issues of foreign affairs.

The author emphasizes that these particular axioms are neither wholly believed nor disbelieved; some of the propositions are even contradictory. It is, therefore, suggested that it might be useful to think of the two sets of axioms as polar types. The substantial difference in views between the older generation and the current generation of young Americans, as manifested in both groups of axioms, are made significant by the *crucial experiences* in which these differences in attitudes are grounded.

The crucial experiences of the leaders who forged post-war American foreign policy were the following: the aftermath of the First World War, the unavoidable lesson of isolationism, Munich and the failure of the West, the confidence of being unselfconsciously right in World War II, false hopes shattered by communist aggression, and the loss of Eastern Europe and China.

On the other hand, the crucial experiences of young Americans are Viet Nam (rather than World War II), the Blacks, the poor, the problems of the quality of national life. Furthermore, on the international level, the demise of monolithic communism, the partial convergence of interests between the United States and the Soviet Union and the fact that except for the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 the fundamental character of international politics in the period of young Americans' formative experiences has been essentially orderly.

What has the Viet Nam problem in particular taught young Americans?

1. A militant disbelief in the older axioms. The American government's attempt to stretch the old guidelines in order to justify Viet Nam has devalued that currency.

2. A deep doubt about the reliability of the us government as a source of information.

3. An awareness that the us government is no more moral than other governments.

4. A recognition that even the United States can "lose" and, finally,

5. A knowledge that the costs of "empire" are borne disproportionately by young Americans.

The author concludes by suggesting that the major American foreign policy issue for the rest of this century will be the extent of US military and political involvement in external affairs. It is therefore important to stress that what will soon be known as the lesson of involvement will be no less rooted in the consciousness of young Americans today than were the "lessons of isolationism" in the previous generation. This contrast highlights the dual danger we face: the older generation has enormous difficulty in escaping the lessons of the past which may now be somewhat obsolete, while young Americans may have insufficient historical perspective to distinguish between froth and substance in current situations.

A GENERAL REACTION BY AN AMERICAN PARTICIPANT TO THE WORKING-PAPER

One of the American participants gave the following general reaction to the contents of the working paper:

The not too optimistic report reinforces the speaker's feeling that American students are turning their backs on the study of history in favour of the soft fashionable disciplines (or indisciplines) of sociology. Consequently, the nation faces the awful possibility of a generation without memory, fated to blunder on like a child, failing to recognize the follies and fallacies that history could have pointed out.

The quoted comments of activist youth are in fact, for the most part, frighteningly naive and usually consist of no more than tags and invectives. It is moreover disquieting that any generation can appear to take seriously the "Sayings of Chairman Mao", a tedious collection of bromides and banalities.

To the extent that members of the new generation do briefly study history, they tend to limit their knowledge to the scribblings of certain "revisionist" historians who support distortions of events by quoting Marcuse or other likeminded brothers within their own closed circle.

However, the working paper *principally* suggests to this speaker that the older generation of Americans, because of a lack of honesty and clarity in stating what objectives it was seeking through its foreign policy, bears a great deal of responsibility for some of the younger generation's aberrations.

One of the first great US post-war mistakes was in the phrasing of what has since become known as the Truman Doctrine, brought to its most eloquent expression in President Kennedy's Inaugural Address (quoted in the working paper). This doctrine—according to which the Unites States would help any nation anywhere defend itself against aggression from whatever source—gravely overstated what Washington ever intended to do and consequently confused not only other nations but even those charged with international relations in the US administration.

The quite honorable and straightforward objective of American foreign policy has *in fact* been to preserve peace by maintaining a precarious balance of power with the Soviet Union and, more recently, with Mainland China. To achieve this, the US had, with the aid of its allies, resisted the fracturing of the de facto status-quo, established during the early post-war period.

Nevertheless, while practicing balance of power politics, the US felt compelled to disavow such a course of action. The speaker suggests that this behaviour may to a certain extent be attributed to, for example, the utterances of the Founding Fathers, President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of State James Byrnes, all of whom, albeit for different reasons, wished to renounce balance of power politics, spheres of influence, etc.

The speaker suggests that there was a particular contrast between formulation and policy during Mr. Dulles' tenure of office when the "tough game in a tough league" of maintaining a power balance was presented as a "crusade against Godless Communism". In spite of his pious talk about the "Liberation of Eastern Europe", Secretary of State Dulles was, for example, the first to award implicit recognition to the Soviet sphere of interest when Russian tanks rolled into Budapest.

Inevitably this false formulation has ultimately misled the nation into the quagmire of Vietnam where Tonkinese aggression was mistaken for Chinese aggression. And because the intervention in Vietnam was undertaken on false premises, it is likely to teach all the wrong lessons not only to young Americans but to youth throughout the world.

Yet the speaker is not as certain as the American author of a substantial withdrawal of American power and influence. Judging by experience in the contemporary world it is unsafe to predict that when the United States withdraws from a given area, other nations will take up the burden of necessary defense. Against this background it is not at all certain what Washington will decide.

DISCUSSION

DANGER OF A US RETRACTION FROM THE WORLD SCENE

During the discussion there seemed to be a concensus amongst American as well as European participants that the current trend in the United States was

directed towards at least some qualified American withdrawal or retraction around the world.

A Netherlands participant expressed his fear that the world might possibly, even probably, soon witness a US retraction in the international scene. Should Washington more or less abdicate its role around the globe, the very security of the United States might in the end be directly affected and endangered. An American withdrawal would result in a vacuum that would no doubt be filled up by other powers which would, more often than not, be hostile to the United States. Eventually the United States would by its very aloofness be forced into a conflict with such powers in order to protect its own interests. The Netherlands speaker also warned that US retractions would lead to retractions by others, resulting in a disequilibrium instead of a balance of power.

An American and two British participants warned against the danger of isolationism in the US. The fabric of several parts of the world being dependent upon American conventional and/or nuclear military defence, would crumble if this shield were to be withdrawn. One of the British speakers was moreover not persuaded by the hypothesis that the development of cultural relations and communications would prevent a US return to isolationism and a neglect of its allies.

An American participant stressed that he deplored the use by several speakers of the word "isolationism". There was only, according, to this observer, "a trend towards some withdrawal" in the United States. Nevertheless, Washington has not withdrawn from any of its 42 alliances; this then is not the same phenomenon as the isolationism of the 30's during which period the present US involvement would have been inconceivable.

Another American participant, on the other hand, agreed with some of the conclusions of the working paper although he thought they might even be an understatement. These conclusions are that *a.* the next 25 years will witness a retraction of American power around the world; *b.* the preoccupation of young Americans with foreign affairs is—Vietnam excepted—at the bottom of the list and *c.* there will consequently be a concentration on US domestic problems. According to this speaker, the United Nations is the only international organ which still has the capacity to stimulate some interest among young Americans. On the whole, there is every indication of such a major US withdrawal from international affairs as to amount to a return to isolationism. Hence a study on how to prevent isolationism is one of the major requirements of our time; in this context it will be necessary to make the relevant dilemma's real to young Americans.

A British participant suggested that the prevalent mood among younger Americans today is similar to that of young Britishers in the 30's; the latter attempted to rationalise and perhaps justify their fears of having to fight by persuading themselves that Hitler's Germany was not aggressive. Likewise L.B.J.'s credibility gap and the loss of faith in the accuracy of US government statements may be a rationalisation of younger Americans' desire to remove themselves from the dangers of a threatening and unpleasant world.

Another British and an American participant, referring to the working paper, emphasized that distrust of involvement overseas was not only a prerogative of the younger but also of the older generation in the US. The British speaker suggested that the current inward-looking sentiments in America, partially caused by the Vietnam conflict, were similar to those existing in the UK after the Suez debacle in 1956. He added that of course Vietnam was not the only reason for US retraction; undoubtedly the manifold "Yank go Home" slogans on foreign walls must also have had an effect.

An American participant stressed that the Nixon Doctrine is *not* a rationalisation of American withdrawal around the globe. Its purpose is rather to find ways of maintaining US responsibilities toward the rest of the world while taking into account the actual changes of circumstances in US relations with other countries as well as the fact that the balance of power is essentially a psychological structure. In a sense the US role is being updated because other countries now have a greater capacity than formerly to sustain their independence and integrity. Furthermore, the two superpowers no longer have the ability, that still did exist ten years ago, to influence the actions of other countries. Nevertheless, when US policies are adapted to these changes, this should not cause a run on the bank; the US administration must in any case maintain the credibility of its commitments. If such a goal is to be attained, this can only be done by enlisting the support of those under 30. In this connection the question must be asked how an administration bent on sustaining its commitments might cope with its constituents—also those above thirty. In what manner can the argument be made credible that if the United States "packed up" the world would be a worse place to live in?

Two other participants, referring principally to the previous speakers' remarks about the Nixon Doctrine, stated that it would be very recommendable to examine what events in present day international politics might constitute "a new Munich".

US RETRACTION IN WESTERN EUROPE

There seemed to be a concensus that *in case* US power is to some degree withdrawn from Western Europe, it would be desirable if the affluent Europeans of the 70's could fill the gap with their own resources. A marked dif-

ference of opinion existed, however, about the *desirability* of US military retraction from the European continent.

According to a British participant, there exists a growing fear in Europe that US participation will cease to be credible and that Washington can no longer be relied upon to commit its forces. The result might be that Europe will "turn in on itself" as an organ of foreign and defensive policy. Already European powers are making functional defensive adjustments such as the British dispatch of the 6th Brigade to Germany to replace Canadian contingents and the German offer to pay more in order to keep US troops in the Central Sector. This British speaker is not happy about such a trend and suggests that confidence in the US would be strengthened if the US would not reduce its commitments.

A Norwegian speaker emphasized that recent events in Czechoslovakia have demonstrated that there exists no short-cut to detente. Negotiations with the Soviet block must be conducted from a basis of military strength and political solidarity. Supported by an Icelandic participant, the Norwegian speaker stressed that force levels must not be reduced unless in the framework of mutual and balanced force reductions between East and West. Unilateral American reductions in Europe will weaken the Western MBFR negotiating position, upset the balance of power in a serious fashion, stimulate the reduction of Western European forces, and lead to a lower level of conventional forces so that the strategy of flexible response will become less realistic. Furthermore, a US reduction of conventional forces might lead to Germany filling the gap which would not be conducive to detente and might additionally stimulate the idea of a European Nuclear Force which is contrary to the Soviet-American non-proliferation policy. A British speaker added that West European nations, even with the assistance of the Federal Republic, would not in the foreseeable future be able to erect a nuclear force which would have a striking power that could be compared to the size of the present US and Soviet nuclear capability (including the "delivery systems"). To attempt to do so would lead to a waste of resources on a preposterous scale. Furthermore this British participant agreed with the previous speaker that the Western deterrent would be undermined by unilateral US troop reductions that were carried out without previous consultations with the NATO allies and without a contemporaneous increase in West European military contributions.

A British and an International participant feared that not only American but also European troop-reductions would take place in the 70's. As Europeans start doubting the total effectiveness of the NATO deterrent this might lead to a defence disintegration; individual countries will commence drawing up their own defence insurance policies leading toward different (also nuclear) direc-

tions. The international speaker expressed his hope that the Europeans, while almost certainly reducing their overall forces in the 1970's, might, particularly at the technical level, simultaneously construct a more rational and "tighter" defense organisation. Under these circumstances the total number of 2.000.000 West European soldiers could indeed to some extent be reduced in a responsible fashion without endangering the conventional and nuclear security balance in a détente situation. Answering a Netherlands participant's questions about the future of the British and French independent nuclear deterrent systems, another British speaker stated that he did not believe these forces could in the foreseeable future be used as a dependable deterrence shielding the Federal Republic. In other words, without Bonn being actively involved, an effective European nuclear deterrence system could not really exist.

An American speaker warned that Europeans should not lash their hopes for the future (with regard to US military presence in Europe) to a sinking ship, while there are safer alternatives. When questioned by other participants what these alternatives might be, the aforementioned speaker was unable to provide a concrete answer. Supported by two compatriots, he did emphasize that Europeans and Americans could most usefully address themselves to possible actions that might be undertaken to place security considerations in a healthy perspective. Backed up by another compatriot, he furthermore warned Europeans against clinging to the present number of American troops as the only evidence of the US commitment. In investing that symbol with more weight than it deserves, the Europeans would be making a fundamental mistake.

The aforementioned speaker also emphasized that Europeans should not use the argument that they would not be able or willing to fill the military gap created by US retraction; such an assertion would only play into the hands of American isolationists.

A Canadian member stated that on the one hand there were enough US nuclear stockpiles in Europe to meet any Soviet scenario, while on the other hand there were insufficient conventional forces to constitute a credible flexible response (except against limited incursions). Against this background the speaker asked whether the North American commitment to the defence of Europe remained credible by the manifested presence of US and Canadian troops which might only be described as hostages.

A Norwegian member answered that the NATO conventional force levels are strong enough to support flexible response today, but this might possibly not be the case if other nations were to follow the recent example of unilateral troop reductions by a country close to the previous speaker's heart.

An international participant added that although the North American

military posture in Europe might seem insufficient to us, we have no way of knowing whether from the Soviet point of view this American presence might not raise the "risk-factor" to a level where aggression becomes an unacceptable course of action. A similar evaluation might, however, not be made by Moscow if American forces are withdrawn and substituted by European contingents, especially as the tactical nuclear weapons and the major strategic strike power behind Western conventional forces are also American. In other words, the present deterrent thinking should *also* be governed by the other party's estimated perception of what we are doing.

A British speaker thought that the withdrawal of us troops from Europe might serve as an instigation for the Europeans to do more themselves. Several members stated that the Europeans are currently too complacent about political, economic and military actions that need to be taken in the face of possible us military retraction from the Central European Sector. An American participant thought that if and when Europeans gave proof of their burden-sharing, this would cause a favourable shift in us legislative and public opinion.

An American participant expressed the belief that there would be a period of us withdrawal from Europe. This retraction will not constitute a rejection of Europe in a positive sense but will come as a result of a severe crisis within the United States, which threatens the internal security of the nation. After having solved its internal difficulties the us will effect a comeback; eventually Europe and the World will be better off as a result of this withdrawal-and-return since the us will then be in a stronger position than previously.

A French participant stated that, although he could understand the preoccupation of some Europeans with the balance of power, he did not attach a great deal of importance to a us military contribution in Europe, particularly if Europe were able to constitute a veritable, well organised, military force of its own. He added that from a realistic point of view it should not be possible for France to have both a nuclear and a conventional force without destroying its own national economy. Unhappily it does not seem possible to renounce either of these forces so that France is confronted with a deadlocked situation.

Another Frenchman stated that he did not find the maintenance of us troops in Europe entirely useless.

An American speaker asserted that the us administration attaches great importance to the maintenance of us commitments in Europe. It has stated repeatedly that there would be no reduction of us trooplevels in the European Central Sector before the end of fiscal 1971 (i.e. June 1971). As yet no decision has been taken beyond fiscal 1971; future force levels and strategy are still under review by the National Security Council. Insofar as it is possible to speculate on the outcome of the review it would, according to this speaker,

be an anticipation of the Administration's determination to maintain force levels beyond fiscal 1971.

Finally, another American participant speculated that a lowering of us conventional force levels in the Central Sector might very well also positively effect the force levels at the other side of the Iron Curtain.

NATO

An international participant stressed three propositions: *a*. NATO is essential to security interests and needs of the free world; *b*. an organised collective force is essential to a viable NATO and *c*. a us force of current size is necessary for the organisation of such an organised collective force.

The international participant furthermore stated that NATO goals are defence, deterrence and solidarity. The deterrence, which consists of conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear forces, might become less credible if and when the necessary forces were not in position. In this context it would be appropriate to question whether gaps in the NATO Central European Sector, caused by a possible future withdrawal of us conventional forces, might be filled by the European NATO allies. According to the speaker, European leaders have suggested this would *not* happen. To the contrary, an earlier decrease of American troop contingents in 1967 was followed by similar action and "restructurisation" of other allied, NATO earmarked forces in Europe. Moreover, even if the Europeans did provide forces to fill the gap, the international speaker doubted whether they could be really substituted for the former us military role.

The international participant suggested that the Europeans might do well to create their own centre of power; in such a case the Soviets would perhaps show themselves more willing to reduce the causes of tension (i.e. the enormous Warsaw Pact forces overhanging the narrow fringe of Western Europe). This might for example be done by means of mutual and balanced force reductions. Only when this has come to pass, can the us military contribution to the NATO Central European Sector be safety altered.

An American participant stated that the present Administration in Washington regards us participation in and commitment to NATO as the fundamental cornerstone for any serious longterm effort to construct a more stable and peaceful world.

A Netherlands speaker emphasized that for a long time to come NATO will be a great necessity. He added that at present there is a general shift of emphasis within the Alliance from purely military toward civilian matters, such as East-West relations including a possible European Security Conference, the studies on the environment, etc.

The Netherlands participant was of the opinion that if the US were to partially withdraw their forces from the NATO Central Sector, if the (naval) balance of power in the Mediterranean were not improved, and if the influence of the "new left" in NATO member countries continued to grow, the chances of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union would diminish accordingly. For it is, according to this speaker, only in a situation of balance that the Kremlin might wish to negotiate.

A Portuguese speaker noted that today's questions surrounding NATO are different from those in 1949. The current question is: what kind of Alliance do we want, a purely military organisation or also a political organisation to defend our political and ideological values? It is doubtful whether a treaty creating NATO today, would be signed with provisions identical to those in the 1949 Treaty. Hence it is necessary that the near future should bring about a reappraisal and reconsideration of NATO in the context of present political realities. These realities are currently not only confined to threats against Europe and North America, but also consist of a substantial threat on a global scale.

An international participant stated that in the 1970's NATO could only justify its existence by actively striving for detente. A British speaker felt that NATO was becoming overwhelmed by its own success; because it had been successful in preventing war during the past 20 years, people had really forgotten what the basic "raison d'être" of the Alliance in fact is.

A French speaker declared that France should remain in the North Atlantic Alliance; membership of the North Atlantic Council gives France an opportunity to explain its position. The foundations of the Alliance should, however, not be of an exclusively military nature, but should also extend towards political and social levels. Furthermore, the Alliance should have a political ideology; in this framework the French speaker deplored the situation in Greece. Moreover, the French speaker added, the time has come to redefine, within the framework of the Alliance, a new type of society and thereby reply to the aspirations of North American and European youth.

A German speaker noted that few Europeans think there is any political objective which might make the Soviets run the risk of an all-out confrontation with NATO. Against this background he wondered whether, as has been the doctrine until this date, NATO should be ready for the extreme case (i.e. an all-out Warsaw Pact attack against the NATO Central Sector and the flanks), or on the other hand whether it should only prepare itself for the more probable case (i.e. a smaller localised conflict in the Berlin area, the northern flank, or the south-eastern flank). The speaker concluded by stating that we (NATO) still do not know what a commitment really is; perhaps a higher US economic

involvement in Europe may compensate for the withdrawal of American troops from the Central Sector.

EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

An American participant stated that the current US Administration's comparative lack of interest in a European Security Conference was caused by the fact that Warsaw Pact proposals for such a meeting were *not* focussed on the objective of European Security. The Prague Communiqué dated October 31, 1969 only mentioned the mutual renunciation of force (redundant because of article 2 of the UN Charter) and discussions on technical scientific, and economic co-operation as possible agenda items for a European Security Conference. The NATO allies, on the other hand, had at the Reykjavik Ministerial meeting in June 1968, the Washington Ministerial meeting in April 1969, and the Brussels Ministerial meeting in December 1969 offered serious negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions. The NATO Ministerial Council would probably offer more specific MBFR proposals at its May 1970 meeting in Rome.

The interest of the US Administration in these proposals lies in the opportunity they afford the Soviet Union and its allies to indicate a willingness to engage in serious negotiations towards détente. For it is the *kind* of evidence, which Washington seeks, indicating that detente can actually be brought about that constitutes the only possible point of disagreement between the United States and some of its European allies. In this connection the speaker emphasized that the significance of this Administration's "era of negotiation" is that it would afford "correct evidence of actual realities".

A Netherlands speaker stated that it is now generally accepted that the United States and Canada, if they so wish, will attend a possible European Security Conference. The GDR will also participate, such a participation will, however, not imply recognition. The Dutch participant also referred to recent NATO Ministerial Communique's proposing negotiations on MBFR, Germany and Berlin and to the Warsaw Pact's unsatisfactory reply in the Prague Communique of October 31, 1969. The speaker concluded by saying that as long as there is no agreement on a substantial agenda and no prospect of some results—"even very modest concrete results"—it is far from certain that a European Security Conference can be held.

A Portuguese participant was of the opinion that the Soviet Union has been promoting the idea of a European Security Conference as a means of effective propaganda. Moscow is fully aware that its proposals, expressed in the Prague Communique, cannot be accepted by the West. By refusing mutual renunciation of force and technical scientific and economic co-operation as ESC agenda-items, the West is left with the burden of a negative stand.

The discussion on this subject developed against the background of a German participant's extensive introduction (see annex page 83) and mainly concentrated on Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik.

An American participant stated that the US Administration does not feel the degree of malaise toward Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik, that has been attributed to it by some outsiders. If Washington has not in public appeared more "hospitable" with regard to Herr Brandt's overtures towards the Soviet Union and East European countries, it is only because of American sensitivity about interfering in the affairs of other nations. Indeed, the United States is of the opinion that negotiations by the Federal Republic with Moscow, Pankow and Warsaw might have the same potential significance as President Nixon's "era of negotiations". Also Washington believes that Chancellor Brandt has not exaggerated the hopes of the Ostpolitik's possible success. Failure to achieve at least some accomodation with the East would be instructive vis-à-vis the possibilities of detente—the more so since the German issue is the most central and substantive of current European problems.

A Netherlands and a German participant agreed that the policies of the Federal Republic are crucial for the future of Europe. The former believed that if Chancellor Brandt persists in his Ostpolitik and has sufficient political support in the Bundestag, he might be able to diffuse the dangerous and hypocritical situation currently existing in Central Europe. Simultaneously he would be justified in pointing out Pankow's present inflexibility toward changing its policies.

Another Netherlands speaker emphasized that the allies, given present circumstances, can do little else but to assist Chancellor Brandt in his efforts to find some legal formula to recognise the GDR and the Oder-Neisse Line; the Western democracies should, however, not force his hand by their *premature* recognition of Pankow. There is, however, in general, according to this speaker, no serious opposition against a recognition of the status-quo in Germany; the only concrete obstacle is of a legal nature, i.e. a clause in the constitution of the Federal Republic stipulating "Alleinvertretung" or sole right of representation. A larger majority than can presently be acquired within the Bundestag would be needed to ammend this provision; in order to obtain that majority, psychological problems within the Federal Republic would first have to be solved.

A German participant pointed out that official utterances by Chancellor Brandt are not only directed toward the amelioration of the psychological problems within the Federal Republic, but are also, in fact, intended to improve the special relations between the two Germanies and the situation within and around Berlin. The aim of Bonn's foreign policy is not only to reach an agreement on some formula based on the status-quo, but also to bring about real progress in East-West relations.

An International speaker considered some elements constituting the status-quo (to which the previous participant had referred), as being unacceptable. In this context he referred to the Berlin wall.

A German participant warned that the Ostpolitik, which in itself constitutes a constructive policy, might entail the following three dangers: a retardation of progress towards unity in Western Europe, a further weakening of the Western Alliance and a loosening of the Federal Republic's ties to the West. A rather disengaged public opinion in Western countries generally tends to regard the Ostpolitik as a predominantly German affair. It would, however, be an overestimation to believe that Bonn can carry out the Ostpolitik by itself.

The same speaker wondered whether the West would stand to gain by talks between Brandt and Stoph at Kassel in May. At any rate Bonn would have shown its good will by demonstrating its preparedness to make sacrifices for detente. Simultaneously it would be instructive—also for other Western countries—to test the possibilities of reaching at least some agreement. Because of the sympathy that the Ostpolitik causes in Western countries, the Federal Republic might be even more "accepted" than previously and might thereby accelerate the process of West European integration.

A Danish speaker emphasized that the Federal Republic's efforts with regard to Ostpolitik can only succeed against the background of a strong US political presence in Europe.

Another German participant expressed the belief that Pankow's goals in conducting talks with Bonn are 1) political and legal recognition; 2) (as had previously been stated) a loosening of Bonn's ties with NATO and 3) a reduction of the presence in the Federal Republic of companies with transnational interests (in this context IBM is especially referred to by East Germany).

The same speaker felt that there was a "certain exaggeration of hopes" within the West German population with regard to the Brandt-Stoph talks. In this context he warned against a possible "back-lash". He, nevertheless, also believed that Bonn should try to see how far it could go in reaching an agreement that might be instructive to other Western countries.

Finally, a German speaker pointed out the following differences between East Germany and other East European countries:

1. East Germany has the highest standard of living and is the second producer in the communist world; it therefore has a relatively strong position

in the Soviet camp and is no longer always passively receiving instructions from Moscow.

2. While East Germany preaches abstinence to all East European countries in dealing with Bonn, it nevertheless quietly builds up its own very intensive trade relationship with the Federal Republic (and thereby profits indirectly from the advantages of the Common Market). Inevitably the East European countries find this attitude unacceptable and are therefore starting to deal with the West Germans—a course of action which inherently weakens Pankow.

3. East Germany, contrary to the other East European countries, does not, as was recently demonstrated at Ehrfurt, possess national communism.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Several speakers were surprised by the fact that the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and its aftermath had been completely omitted from the American working paper. An Icelandic participant in particular stated that (American) youth has apparently not been impressed by events in Czechoslovakia, nor noticed that Moscow has once again shown that it has not relinquished expansion when there is no counter-force present to prevent such action. A British speaker added that a lack of interest amongst US youth for Czechoslovakia might point to a certain (expanding) trend toward American isolationism.

A US participant answered that the American author had not mentioned Czechoslovakia because Americans equate Soviet action against that country with US intervention in the Dominican Republic.

COMMON MARKET

A number of speakers agreed that much has happened since General de Gaulle's veto against British entry into the Common Market. The European community has progressed from a state of paralysis to "a certain amount of movement" in several areas.

In this context a Netherlands participant referred to the problem of agricultural financing (which has to all intents and purposes been solved since the wine agreement), the reinforcement of the Common Market structure (i.e., the current striving for a future financial union via an economic union as well as efforts toward some framework of political co-operation), the increased power of the European Parliament (which will acquire some more power in the budgetary field but will not have the right to reject budgets) and finally, the envisaged enlargement of Common Market membership (there seems to

be an encouraging progress in determining the conditions of the negotiations but there are also some accompanying dangers).

A French speaker expressed the belief that the problems surrounding the budgetary power of the European Parliament would not be insurmountable. He furthermore emphasized that Western Europe should move energetically not only with regard to its internal organisation but also with regard to its expansion; the time is now ripe, according to this speaker, to deal with British entry into the Common Market. President de Gaulle's opposition to the UK application had not been of a definite nature. In this context the speaker concluded by referring to the General's conversation with Ambassador Soames. "In due course a man not entirely European was becoming a European; the trouble was that some well-known European statesmen did not confine themselves to being pleased with such a conversion but immediately asked the General for proof (of his conversion) and even for contrition!"

A British participant stated that the rather selfish Common Market external tariff policies (in addition to, for example, the Labour Party's decision to withdraw British troops east of Suez) may have had an adverse effect upon internationalist sentiments within the United States.

Several speakers reiterated that American withdrawal from the European continent must be matched by increased European unity and particularly by British entry into the Common Market.

A Norwegian participant stated that British entry into the Common Market would be expedited if the European Community were to commence organising a European Defence Structure.

Finally, a British speaker emphasized that another failure of the UK in its attempts to enter the Common Market would be disastrous for public opinion in Great Britain; already the common agricultural policy and the prospect of higher prices did not appeal to the public and particularly not to the young. The same speaker concluded by saying that it would be wise to have, besides the United States, another unified political entity on a larger scale where a concentrated attempt could also be made to solve the perennial problems raised by environmental deterioration, technological progress, mass education, etc.

THE POLL

Several speakers expressed the opinion that the Harris Poll at the beginning of the report (see page 45) was not entirely dependable. To a certain extent, the rather incomplete phraseology of the questions is suggestive and leads those who are interviewed in a certain direction; moreover, the problems are somewhat isolated since they are considered out of context. An American speaker, for

example, suggested that the poll had been conducted in an atmosphere of relative international tranquility; if one of the four events suggested in the quiz actually occurred, there would undoubtedly be enormous exitement so that the answers in that case might be quite different.

Another American speaker, however, wondered what the results would have been if the same poll were conducted on a nation-wide basis (and had not been confined to 1200 Americans of all ages). He suggested that the general reaction might have been "about the same". Symptomatic is the public support by 57 US Senators of the Mansfield resolution which requires the Administration to consult Congress before the former's actions might lead to further overseas involvement.

This speaker nevertheless agreed with other, notably British, American and Turkish participants, that a rephrasing of the questions might have produced different answers.

THE OLDER AND THE YOUNGER GENERATION

Several speakers agreed that within the United States there is a major foreign and military policy dispute under way which in fact is not a generation issue at all. Paradoxically, according to two American members, US military policy, in particular, is being called into question by some of the very officials who helped shape it. A British and a third American speaker emphasized that distrust of overseas involvement is not only a prerogative of the younger generation. A Turkish participant agreed that in foreign policy there is no cleavage between the older and younger generation; most of the slogans currently used by the latter have been borrowed from the former. Also, according to the Turkish participant, the older people seem to be doing everything within their power to placate the young. A Netherlands speaker stated that youth in the US and the West European countries should not be given the opportunity to induce their governments to change policies; rather, national administrations should adapt their dialectics to present mentalities in order to maintain their current policies. A US participant added "en marge" that younger Americans would probably not very much care if, for example, US oil, copper or tin interests abroad were to be nationalised; they would, however, violently object if these commodities were to be rationed inside the United States, as a result of such a "take-over".

Another US speaker pointed out that not so long ago 25% of American youth were in favour of former governor Wallace as a potential presidential candidate. For the first time in over thirty years the term "conservative" produced a majority in the United States. More specifically, the majority consisted of a populist-conservative movement which pitted its strength against the north-eastern "cosmopolitans" (i.e. students, intellectuals, industrial leaders, etc.).

Still another American participant stated that US youth is seeking a new world state craft and demanding new leadership—not a balance of terror nor a foreign policy established by self-interest. It wishes the United States to assume leadership in challenging and discarding old outmoded policies, and, moreover, to seek a substitute for automatic military response as a solution to differences in views and ideologies. Young Americans, in fact, desire action that is visible and demonstrative: hence long-range diplomatic subtleties, instigated by so-called diplomatic realities, will be practically unacceptable to the younger generation.

Finally, an American speaker asserted that, contrary to its elders, 65-70% of the American population under 45 is, because of their experiences, *disinclined* to fear Soviet aggression (while accepting that the Soviet Union would interfere in its own sphere of influence without endangering Western Europe). The younger Americans *do*, however, fear, and will therefore resist, the expense of maintaining overseas troops, be it in Europe, Japan, Okinawa or Manila. Consequently, when the younger generation assumes leadership from its elders, it will most certainly reduce American overseas military commitments and will probably insist on greater risks in its striving for detente.

ECOLOGY

The paper that formed the basis for the discussions on what has become known as the "environmental problem" was written by a German participant.

THE IMPERATIVES OF ECOLOGY: THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ON THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

I. INTRODUCTION

The problem of man's relationship to his physical and social environment has moved to the foreground of political preoccupation in practically every country. Relevant national programs have been developed, while international organisations (OECD, NATO, UNO) are also beginning to concentrate on this field.

One of the striking aspects of the present debate on the environmental issue is, however, the absence of much concern and speculation about its impact on the future of *international* politics. This may be due to the following two reasons: *a*. the tendency of most politicians and scientists to view the solutions of social problems and priorities primarily in the national context, and *b*. the indeterminate nature of the problem and a lack of information on its substance.

II. WHAT KIND OF ENVIRONMENT AND WHAT KIND OF FUTURE?

The issue may be clarified if one imagines a spectrum of environmental problems: whereas at the one end one would find the physical-technological agents (pollution or lowering of the ground water level), the other end would be occupied by the socio-political problems (wild growth of cities, inadequacy of public services etc.). Between these two points the physical-technological and the socio-political dimensions are mixed in varying proportions.

Because of the extensive nature of these problems, this paper limits itself to the environmental problems which are nearer to the physical-technological rather than the socio-political end of the spectrum. The author emphasises, however, that there are no environmental problems which are of a *purely* physical-technical nature and which could consequently be solved through the mere application of a counterbalancing technology.

The author will extrapolate from present trends in attempting to cope—or failing to cope—with the environmental problems with a view to assessing possible consequences for international politics and demonstrating the need for solutions, and for suggesting some modalitites.

III. THE INESCAPABLE PROBLEM

Environmental problems are of course principally a result of economic growth, technological progress and social change. Three examples of intriguing cases that are amongst others responsible for the gradual destruction of the biosphere are: *a*. the lead contamination of the air (mostly through gasoline); *b*. the "normal" and accidental petroleum spills at sea and *c*. the emission of some twelve billion tons of carbon dioxide a year plus carbon monoxide and dust which may well initiate a change in world climate.

These developments, even though technological in nature, can have a profound impact on social life, for example by causing a deterioration of the physical and mental health of entire populations and areas or severe limitation of economic activities. Hence, unlike some other issues facing the international community, the environmental problem, which mankind can observe and which is bound to become worse, *must* inescapably be dealt with.

IV. FROM WELFARE ECONOMICS TO ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS

Even a minimum program to deal with the worst cases of destruction of the environment requires expenditures of staggering proportions. For example, industrial plants and service facilities will have to make adjustments to counter-act emissions of various forms of waste; cities and towns must invest millions since they will, in order to preserve or increase their viability, have to be reshaped and since they will, in order to safeguard their economic activities etc., also have to solve the perennial problems of pollution, waste-disposal and infrastructure; and last but not least, gargantuan efforts must be made to meet the minimum requirement of feeding people.

Our understanding of the interaction between environmental deterioration and health, climate or social organization is only superficial.

Therefore, huge investments will have to be made in research, effected in order to acquire the necessary knowledge and to develop the necessary means to solve these problems.

Two outcomes are likely: firstly, the debate on the priorities of environmental policies and the distribution of the financial burden will be an important issue in all developed countries; secondly, the solution of the environmental issues cannot be left to self-stabilizing mechanisms—they require regulation, ex-penditures and redistribution of resources and national income. Consequently, the ecological issue is almost certain to bring about a large scale intervention

by political authorities which in turn will lead to a qualitative advance of the welfare state.

V. POSSIBLE IMPACTS ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

a. *"Domesticism" vs. External Involvment*

The question of environment is likely to further strengthen the trend toward "domesticism" which can already be observed in a number of countries. Such a strengthening is motivated by the fact that the demands of voters traditionally focus more on the immediate issues at home rather than on either future problems or on problems in more remote areas.

An increased trend towards domesticism might very well be conducive to inducing political incentives in East and West—specifically in Washington and Moscow—towards a lowering of military spending and might consequently improve some of the conditions for détente. Moreover, the environmental problem might also lead to increased *cooperation* between states. Ecological difficulties, which would have to be overcome by a government, are not only caused by origins within that government's borders; indeed national solutions can be upset by third parties. For example, the best German program to clean the Rhine will remain futile unless Switzerland and France cooperate.

b. *Conflict vs. Multi-national Cooperation*

As the environmental problem becomes increasingly aggravating in industrial societies, it is also likely to lead to conflicts between states. States sharing rivers, lakes, oceans and neighbouring states suffering from air-or ground water pollution etc. are likely to encounter considerable difficulties in distributing their various responsibilities. But while the propensity for conflict rises, the incentives for cooperation are also likely to become stronger, especially where nations directly and visibly interfere with each other (e.g. river pollution); cooperation will be less likely when the difficulties appear distant in space and time or national boundaries are not crossed as in the cases of the ocean, the outer air layers, or the global climate.

c. *Regional vs. Global Forms of Ecological Politics*

Political and administrative cooperation on ecological problems is most likely to be attained by states that are situated in geographical vicinity to each other, sharing for example a lake, a sea, a river or a frontier that cuts through industrialized and populated areas. Both the Baltic and the Rhine are specific possibilities, as there exists an incentive for ecological politics along regional lines. On the whole he believes that Europe, because of the advanced state of industrialization and the intensive social, economic and political interaction among many of its nations, has the highest potential for such regional ecological cooperation. This potential is significantly lower in other areas such as Australia and Japan (countries with few neighbours) and to a lesser degree in the US, the USSR and China (nations whose land masses "absorb" many environmental problems).

It should, however, be stated that national and regional approaches (with the aid of private and semi-public groupings as well as of international organizations) to solve ecological issues can only be preliminary or complementary to a global approach.

VI. APPROACHES TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM

The author suggests that "desirable futures can be invented". The haphazard way in which governments now deal with the question of environment bears no relation to such an active approach to creating the future; no clear model for a prospective society has as yet been made and or even partially implemented.

a. *Toward Multinational Project Politics?*

The often too narrow political and bureaucratic structures of nation states to some extent still confine themselves to *correcting* ephemeral and often unrelated developments. They possess only marginal capacities to effectively utilize the results of modern science and technology for the overall welfare of society. The environmental problems require for their solution a new synthesis of government, science and industry which could be organized around those specific national or regional problems that are regarded as urgent and where a sufficient willingness to act exists. As an example the author suggests a possible multinational Baltic Sea Project aided by common scientific bodies, which might be organized to study the future of the Baltic, its pollution, marine life, the future of its fishing industry etc. Similar projects can be imagined for many other urgent matters.

b. *The Role of International Organizations*

International organizations, through preliminary study, identification of "cores" of problems and, last but not least, their coordinating function, could play an important role as initiators of specific environmental projects. With regard to possible coordination the author suggests that because of the interconnection between a multitude of problems, regional functional multilateral projects cannot proceed very far without dealing with other problems that are relevant to their own subject matter. (For instance a project to clean an international river would have to be linked to the development of and regulations

about new types of detergent.) It is here that an international organization can tie together a number of such projects along regional and/or functional lines.

A number of problems, such as the development of the world climate, or the preservation of the oceans, would, however, not require a regional but a global approach. Under these circumstances regional initiatives might in many instances serve as a useful complement. But regardless of the level at which international organizations become involved, most of them will have to make substantial adjustments in their internal structure and working methods, for example, by synthesising the spheres of administration, research and production.

VII. CONCLUSION

The author concludes by stating that in the process of solving the steadily worsening environmental problems, the most difficult task of practitioners and theorists of politics will be to make sure that the primacy of politics and the democratic nature of political control are maintained.

DISCUSSION

ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMICS

An International participant agreed with the author of the working paper that the environmental problems could not be solved by simply applying a counter balancing technology. Inevitably, political decisions would have to be made on, for example, the establishment of priorities for the allocation of resources. In other words, the environmental issue must be brought within the perspectives of economic thinking and economic policy. Until the present, this has not been the case; several environmental elements such as water, air and the absence of noise have never been considered as economic goods. Moreover, economic policies have usually been aimed at quantitative and objectively measurable goals (such as the increase of GNP, national income, employment and price stability); conversely qualitative goals were never systematically built into economic planning.

Thus in the 1970's Western countries should agree not only on quantitative but also on qualitative economic objectives. To achieve this goal the environmental issue should be brought into practical economic policy along the following concrete lines:

a. technological research on ecological problems should be continued;

b. assessments of environmental effects in quantitative terms should be made

in order to establish estimates of the costs that would be required in order to prevent, reduce, or eliminate ecological problems;

c. conclusions would have to be reached as to who (industry, agriculture, consumers and/or tax-payers) would finance these costs and

d. decisions will have to be taken about the general allocation of resources within the framework of overall government policy; subsequently the application of these decisions will have to be executed through the appropriate forms of legislation etc.

A Canadian participant agreed with the previous speaker that the environmental problem should substantially be brought into economics. He suggested that if this were really to happen beyond the fringe of economic thinking, such action would require a radical reformulation of economic theory. The speaker stated in this context that some 10 years previously he had attempted to arouse the interest of several staff members of the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects for the environmental issue. Unhappily he failed in this endeavour, principally because the traditional economic structures to which these staff-members adhered rejected any consideration of the quality of life, conservation, or any other ecological subjects.

The Canadian speaker furthermore wondered whether, as the author of the working paper had been indicating in the paper, uncontrolled technological and economic change should really more or less passively be considered as an inevitable and given development for the future. He suggested that a "wiser and more beneficial attitude might be to test large scale proposed technical changes" before the bar of human criteria on their probable effects on the environment. Certainly such a course of action would in the longrun be cheaper than the expenses incurred by the ex post facto rectification of the side effects of uncontrolled economic and technological changes.

ENVIRONMENT AND SCIENCE

A Swiss participant stated that the environmental problem contains two distinctly different aspects: firstly, the acquisition of basic scientific information on the specific ecological issues, and, secondly, the consideration of the—usually political—implications of such scientific information. These two aspects are interrelated. For example, the degree to which inconvenient and disagreeable political sacrifices to solve, improve, or prevent environmental problems can be made, is often dependent on the conviction among the public that such sacrifices are in fact worthwhile. The necessary conviction can only be established by a clear and unequivocal explanation by scientists of the nature, and more specifically, the menace to society, of these scientific problems. In this

connection the speaker discerns a "certain danger" in the current fad of not dealing with the ecological problems except by means of a few slogans and a few appeals to common sense; such an approach will certainly *not* be conducive to the necessary conviction.

Against this background the Swiss speaker considers the question of environment an excellent reason to appeal to the sense of responsibility particularly of scientists and university officials; moreover, such a course of action might also be a pretext in favour of effecting a much needed integration between university and society.

ENVIRONMENT AND MAN'S MENTAL HEALTH

A French speaker referred to recent agricultural studies in European countries and specifically to the Common Market Mansholt-Plan, according to which there was a probability that, owing to agricultural overproduction, excess farm-lands would have to be reallocated for other purposes. It would be desirable, according to this participant, if areas that became available could be utilized to disengage urban concentrations and particularly be geared to the construction of a new type of rural environment of a non-agrarian nature. Without such areas for relaxation city-dwellers might eventually become rather neurotic.

On the subject of mankind's mentality, the speaker added the following: "When Man has acquired the *means* to live (for example food, clothing, housing, and leisure) then, he is confronted with another grave problem, the *reasons* to live". In this context the speaker pointed out that this problem can also be applied to the macrocosm of society as a whole in the following way: developing societies are confronted with the problem of *how* to live (which is principally a quantitative problem), while developed societies have the problem of *why* people and institutions live or exist (which is essentially a qualitative problem). Examples of the latter condition are the perennial questions posed in developed countries—for instance "why must there be universities?; why must there be a united Europe?; why must there be international agreements?; why must there be a free world?, etc."

These are "by definition" the questions of youth; and it is the extent to which the older generation is unable to answer these questions that gives rise to the generation gap. In order to forestall such a gap, a complex model containing many variables and parameters must be found which can define the "*why*" and which can subsequently lead to suitable answers. Undoubtedly, the drafting of such a model, of such a definition of "*why*", is indispensable if one wishes not only to let society survive, but also to let society have a will to survive.

ENVIRONMENT—AN EMOTIONAL APPROACH?

An American participant pointed out that whilst nuclear escalation is often regarded as an acute disease, demanding immediate treatment, ecological problems tend te be viewed as a creeping cancer that may be dealt with in due time. In this connection the speaker also referred to a certain passive mentality, illustrated by the rhetorical question "What has posterity ever done for us that we should do something for it?"

To counter the feeling that we have time on our hands, this participant, supported by a compatriot, pleaded for some emotionalism in order to instigate overdue action in the environmental field. He questioned, however, whether the rational Bilderberg membership would constitute the appropriate forum to handle these problems from the necessary emotional angle.

Another American speaker suggested that the ecological problem should be seen within its proper context. There is always a danger that through emotionalism a certain issue might get out of focus. In this connection it is proper to point out, according to the aforementioned participant, that the environmental question is only *one* of the aspects of the interdependence of nations in carrying out increasingly complex tasks.

This interdependence is underlined by the maxim that no nation can improve its situation except at the expense of others. In international monetary relations one country's surplus is another's deficit. In international politics the situation is even worse: almost every problem is out of bounds to discrete autonomous solution. Hence this speaker doubts whether, if international technocrats do focus on this one aspect of international interdependence, their disproportionate concentration will in fact bring about the benign consequences that the author of the paper has suggested.

A third American participant stated that the present discussion gave the impression of being a diversion from the primary issue of war and peace and even a diversion from the real problem of environment as such. While a great deal of attention is focussed on pollution and the destruction of the atmosphere, the very important (also ecological) problems, such as lack of shelter and the complex issue of transportation seem to be falling into the background.

According to this speaker, a positive approach to environment could provide a synthesis of many concerns—including an increased concern for the Third World. In this framework the Atlantic nations might, for example, perform a constructive act in producing simple prefabricated structures which could provide sorely needed shelter in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. This speaker concluded by stating that he was deeply worried that the West might through

its emotions become so preoccupied with essentially insoluble problems, such as the complete elimination of pollution from the atmosphere, that it would be diverted from confronting those vital issues that it has already been attempting to deal with but has hardly started to solve.

The foregoing speaker was supported by a British and a Canadian participant who also emphasized that the Bilderberg Meeting should set the problem of environment into its proper perspective. The main problem that faces us is not so much environment, but rather the fact that there are still too many in this world who are hungry, ill, cold or discriminated against. Politicians should therefore not attempt to substitute the emotional environmental issue for what should be regarded as our primary national task i.e. a striving that every individual can in the course of this generation find some happiness and some fulfillment in his life. We should, according to these participants, not substitute ourselves for the Supreme Being in trying to plan the world for the next generations.

ENVIRONMENT AND THE INDUSTRIES

A British participant stated that the author of the paper had unfortunately, for different reasons, chosen the wrong three pollutants (see page 67) as being responsible for contaminating the atmosphere. In these three specific cases the true facts are the following:

a. *lead contamination of the atmosphere (mostly through gasoline)*
   1. Although the use of lead antiknocks has increased progressively over the last 40 years, there is no proof that lead levels in the atmosphere are rising. Indeed, USA Public Health Service Publication 999-AP-22, the most complete study yet made (1965) on the subject, states that the average lead concentrations in the atmosphere decreased in Philadelphia and Cincinnati but increased in Los Angeles over the years surveyed.
   2. The World Health Organisation's Technical Report No. 406 1968 includes the statement "no harmful effects have been observed due to lead in ambient air, but further investigation is needed".
   3. It should be emphasized that the present trend to eliminate lead alkyls from gasoline in the USA is to facilitate the use of catalyctic convertors for the control of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons. It does not arise from any health considerations associated with lead itself.

b. *sea pollution*
   No political intervention will possibly be able to prevent a negligent sea-captain from hitting the rocks with his oiltanker. The oil industry has, with considerable success, concentrated on sharply confining spillage to cases of navigation errors. Techniques such as "load-on-top" have gone a long way to minimizing pollution due to tank-washing at sea.

c. *carbon dioxide emissions*
   The estimate of a man-made contribution of 12 billion tons p.a. is realistic. However, the Stanford Research Institute estimates that biological decay etc. add some 1000 billion tons to the atmosphere every year. The fact that the overall concentration is increasing and may increase by 25% by the year 2000 certainly requires attention, but the alarmist note struck by the author of the paper must be questioned since it seems that the disturbance

of the radiation balance by fine particles has already reversed any warming trend due to carbon dioxide. However, deeper investigation into this matter would be warranted, as it may well be that an intense programme of reforestation would minimise the carbon dioxide (although it would increase natural pollution of the air by hydrocarbons).

A Netherlands speaker supported the previous intervention. He too considered the lead danger to be very remote. Furthermore, he also (see previous section) warned against the implication of overdramatization and the tackling of the environmental problem with emotions based on half-facts or very disputable facts.

The Netherlands participant emphasized that environmental problems should in first instance be overcome by nationally educated and nationally implemented policies. In this context he urged that OECD's projected collaboration of scientists and economists to deal with the ecological issue (see international participant, below, page 76) should include *industrial* officials, who could address themselves to the feasibility, as distinct from theories, of possible solutions.

An American speaker stated that the oil industry, to which he belonged, had for some years invested a large amount of capital for research in combatting and eliminating pollution. Furthermore, this industry has constructed various novel features in its more modern facilities which drastically reduce those emissions and effluants that might harm the environment. More specifically tanker spills, sulphur in fuel oil for power generators and (with the aid of motor car manufacturers) certain automobile emissions have been sharply cut.

In general, the speaker stated, it is an established fact that the total pollution associated with the oil industry and its products can be reduced to very low and tolerable levels.

It might, however, be more difficult for smaller and weaker firms to finance and recover the costs involved in preventing, eliminating or reducing harmful environmental effects. Moreover, it will not be easy to reconcile public pressures to protect such enterprises with the imperatives of the pollution problem.

A Norwegian speaker expressed his appreciation for the oil companies' efforts to prevent oil pollution at sea. The oil industry, by founding a common organization that already has pollution under control, is far ahead of governments in this specific field. According to the speaker it will take 5 to 7 years to obtain an international treaty on this subject among governments. The Norwegian participant concluded that both oil industries and shipowners have understood their responsibility with regard to pollution and have acted in a concrete and diligent fashion.

A Finnish participant thereupon stated that the pulp industry in his country

consisted of two kinds of factories: firstly, the new plants which are by law equipped with a recovery system to prevent pollution, and, secondly, the older factories which for financial reasons cannot afford to rebuild their facilities to achieve the recovery of chemicals. According to this speaker, the financial problem of these older factories should be considered as a national financial problem to be solved on a national basis.

A British speaker, who had until recently been active in the electric power industry, mentioned that whenever overhead-lines, pilons or powerstations were erected in Southern England, this resulted in public indignation. Yet there never seemed to be any questions about the costs of amenity in individual projects (for example the costs of laying an underground instead of an overhead electrical line). And when the (alternate) costs of the prevention of destroying the beauty of the environment were presented by the industry, these would often paradoxically be regarded as a trick to *destroy* amenity.

The speaker furthermore raised the question of the extent that a community should be charged in financial terms for the protection of the amenity of a rural site that is only inhabited or used by a handful of people. In this connection he cited the example of the erection of a rather attractively designed power-station in a practically desolated region. Far more people protested against this construction than had ever visited the area.

ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

An international speaker suggested that international cooperation should take place not only on a regional basis, to solve for example local pollution problems, but should also include the following, more universal, courses of action: firstly, cooperation in research (such as has already been taking place in the OECD since 1957 and in NATO since 1969); secondly, cooperation in the field of policy decisions on the question of who shall pay for the prevention, lessening or eradication of environmental effects (In order to prevent distortions in free international competition, common basic decisions must be made as to whether either industry, consumers, agriculture or tax-payers shall be held liable for damage caused by for example the pulp, chemical or automobile industries); thirdly, cooperation in the field of determining priorities in the common battle against environmental problems; and, fourthly, cooperation in the identification of common interests and of regions with common problems.

The OECD has, according to the International speaker, already been concentrating on ecological research for many years. Recently it has, however, for the first time combined economic planners and scientists in a common framework which will determine a first list of priorities and which will draft an action-program through which environmental problems can be consciously moulded into economic policy actions of all industrialized states, including Japan, with market economies.

More generally, the speaker concluded that the production of industrialized nations will probably increase 5% annually; there seems to be no reason why this additional output of wealth might not on a coordinated basis also be used to counter adverse environmental effects. At the same time, however, the developed nations should, particularly in the framework of the Second Development Decade marking the 1970's, be careful not to reduce their responsibilities towards the Third World.

An American participant stated that he favoured the Kennan proposal which recommended that an international environmental agency be created by, for instance, the ten larger powers. Such an agency, which should not be organized within the existing UN and OECD structures, might have the following terms of reference:

a. it must avoid duplicating the work of other international organizations;

b. it should review possible environmental actions from a standpoint of mankind's ecological needs as a whole;

c. it could keep governments informed about minimum needs;

d. it might *advise* governments what measures should be taken;

e. it must assure that certain ecological standards are maintained or are established; perhaps the agency could on an impartial basis even contribute to the enforcement of established rules and regulations;

f. it does, however, not need to have its own executive functions except in those cases when there is not other international agency taking appropriate measures.

A Finnish participant stated that he was rather sceptical about submitting environmental problems to large international organizations. Such a procedure would be very time consuming. Circumstances require that action should be taken as soon as possible in order to save future expenses. Particularly in the paper and pulp industries, where adequate know-how exists to prevent environmental impairments, the necessary measures should be applied preferably on a *national* and perhaps also on a *regional* basis.

A Canadian speaker believed that environmental problems could sometimes lead to international cooperation but also to international contention. In this context he mentioned the following two illustrative examples: the profound

pollution of Lake Erie was resulting not only in cooperation between the US and Canadian federal authorities, but also in increasing collaboration between the littoral US states and Canadian provinces. On the other hand, the discovery of oil in Alaska, which American companies wish to transport by sea to US markets, might result in the upsetting of the delicate ecological balance in the North-West Passage, if and when this water-way is made legally accessible to large oil tankers. Such a development would hardly be palatable for Canada; nevertheless, US oil companies wish to transport Alaskan oil as cheaply and as efficiently as possible to the consumer. It is evident that in such a case international contention can hardly be avoided.

Another US participant pointed out that actions in the environmental field by developed countries should not widen the gap between the "have" nations of the north and the "have not" nations of the south. He added that there will undoubtedly be further attempts to deal with the global environmental problem in international organizations. In this context the American speaker emphasized that adequate preparations should be made for the UN Conference on the Environment at Stockholm in 1972: particularly students of international relations should pose questions about the nature of the organization or organizations—besides the UN, the OECD and the one suggested by Kennan—that might effectively deal with environmental problems.

ENVIRONMENT AND NATIONAL MEASURES

One American mentioned that he had recently served on a White House Commission on Economic Growth and the Environment. He believed that this organ had achieved a fairly good balance between the following main elements that had been considered, e.g.: population policy; cost and benefit analyses of economic and other human activity; shifts in the composition of the national product and the total costs involved; and finally, the necessity of producing and consuming vast resources in order to achieve a better quality of life, social reforms, and urban rehabilitation.

With regard to population policy, the committee had decided that a steady growth in economic activity, accompanied by market interplay within a set of goals and guidelines laid down by public decision, would be essential and also feasible. The costs of such a policy would in the last analysis have to be shared by the whole population in its capacity as consumers and tax-payers.

The speaker furthermore mentioned both national and international preparations for the UN Conference on the Environment at Stockholm in 1972. In this context, it had already become apparent that many of the less-developed nations—particularly the producers of raw materials—are not anxious to be

"cleaned up", if such action implies serious retardation of their development. Finally, this participant expressed doubt as to whether American federal, state and particularly local authorities can organize themselves to take the appropriate steps in order to control and reduce the very large percentage of the total pollution and other causes of the deterioration of the environment for which they are directly responsible.

The previous intervention was partly contradicted by another American participant who stressed that the following concrete action had been taken in the United States: in 1967 the Air Quality Act was passed as a federal law; during 1968 the National Air Pollution Control Administration defined eight homogeneous atmosphere areas for which it directed the governors of the states to indicate public compliance in the ecological field under the following conditions: "Within six months the states will, after public hearings adopt ambient air quality standards and additionally devise a plan for the implementation, maintenance and enforcement of such standards". According to the speaker, some federal funds were allocated to finance the costs of establishing local units to combat inter-county pollution, but the general costs of the application of these measures were left to industry and in some cases to the tax-payer.

This speaker concluded by stating that the net cost to the consumer for cleaning up power stations all over the United States would be an increase of approximately 3.5% on his electricity bill.

A Netherlands speaker added that 30% of the available food and vegetation throughout the world is consumed by insects; this amounts to a waste of fourteen hundred million tons of food per year. Perhaps if individual nations are not too squeamish about the less important (ecological) side effects of preventing such a waste, this prevention might keep millions of humans from being hungry.

An International participant stated that a recent OECD analysis had indicated that the proportion of the US research and development effort, dedicated to the environmental problem, currently only amounts to 0.3%. However, because of recent policies this percentage is likely to rise within the not too distant future. On the other hand, the speaker did not believe that the Soviet Bloc, as yet, regarded environmental problems as being of a very important nature. But locally—for example in the cases of the Caspian Sea and Lake Baikal—this was a different matter. Here, at least, there seemed to be some awakening of concern. Against this background the international speaker thought that should the East European and Western countries really be seeking subjects of mutual

interest, they might do well to choose the environmental issue—a topic with low political vibrations—and to accept the broad problems raised by the author of the paper as a basis for future cooperation.

Another phenomenon that had been noticed within the OECD, was the fact that in very many countries governmental responsibility for urban problems was until recently spread out among seven or eight national agencies. In any nation it was difficult to find government officials with overall formal responsibility for these matters. Only during the past few years have governmental structures slowly begun to adapt themselves to dealing effectively with ecological issues on a centralized basis. At last people are emerging who can take a coordinated (i.e. from a political, economic, technical, as well as a juridical approach) view of the whole issue.

AUTHOR'S FINAL REMARKS

The author of the report began his concluding comments by expressing strong disagreement with some of the industrialists (see pp. 74, 75, 76) and regret at their attitude. He thought industrialists should—not only in the public interest but also in their own—make it a point to discover the elements of truth and substance in the statements made by ecologists and then seek suitable ways to deal with the relevant problems. On one specific point, he considered the industrialists' arguments with regard to the alleged lack of harmful effects of, for example, lead, to be somewhat premature. The fact is, he said, that scientists simply do not yet know what harmful effect lead or other agents might have on public health; their current knowledge on this subject can be compared to the visible part of an iceberg.

Finally, the author expressed agreement with those speakers who did not consider the current active concern for adverse environmental effects as a public hysteria. He too considered it the duty of responsible men to point to the problem—as with cancer—at an early stage in order that a cure might yet be achieved. But he also agreed with the American speaker who had stated that the environmental problem should be dealt with in the context of other problems.

* * *

During the dinner offered by the President of the Swiss Confederation, His Royal Highness expressed the gratitude of all those present to Mr. Umbricht, Mr. Reutlinger and the other Swiss hosts for all they had done to make the Meeting such a succes. The Prince also expressed his deep appreciation to the

authors of the working papers and thanked the members of the Secretariat as well as the interpreters for their excellent work.

A United States participant thanked His Royal Highness on behalf of all participants for the stimulating Meeting, which he personally considered to be the most interesting one in recent years.

ANNEX

Intervention by the German author of the working paper on the Second Item of the Agenda.

Royal Highness, Gentlemen,

The steering committee had originally asked me to lead off the discussion by making a number of observations on developments in Europe and the West in general; but now, due to the vicissitudes of German politics, the representatives of the Government and those of the parliamentary parties could not come. For that reason I am afraid that in the 15 minutes at my disposal I shall not be able to cover all the subjects mentioned in the questionaire distributed to you for the discussion.

Therefore I shall try to focus in particular on the German question and its consequences for Europe and the Western system, as well as on the development of German policy and its implications for the West.

I would like to analyze the German problem and present German policies from three different but interconnected angles: first, in the context of the historical process; second, in the context of the Western system and East-West relations in Europe; and, third, in the context of the goals as they are intended by the Government, goals of the policies vis-à-vis Poland, vis-à-vis East Germany, and vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as a whole.

Let me from the outset declare my point of view: I think I am rather biassed in favour of the Government's policy. But I hope that, if I am carried away too much by my prejudices, the members of the Opposition present will duly add corrections to what I say.

Let me turn to my first point—the German problem and West German policies in the context of the historical process. Although I share the lack of inhibition, characteristic of political scientists, in making statements about the environment and the present, I would not dare to make a prediction about the future of the historical process, but I think the German problem has now been with us for a sufficiently long time to allow for conclusions about a certain trend.

Here, in my view, the crucial event in the last years that helps us to mark this trend, is the Czechoslovakian crisis, the intervention of several Eastern European countries in Czechoslovakia. This event demonstrated with cruel clarity a number of things, particularly the fundamental and indeed irrecon-

cilable difference in interests, between the two German states. It showed that the interests of the two German states were completely integrated within the respective systems of which they form a part—with West Germany supporting the evolution of a liberal nonconformist communism in Czechoslovakia and East Germany doing everything it could to preserve orthodoxy because it views liberalization as a threat to its own system.

But more important, when one German state is willing to resort to the ultimate means of foreign policy, in other words, is willing to go to war, to prevent the very outcome the other German state regards as eminently desirable, then it seems to me that the historical process of the division of Europe that started in 1945 has come to a point where some of the models, images, and goals of the past are called into question, and the division not only of Germany but of Europe as well becomes very vividly demonstrated.

Indeed it seems to me that these events have called into question the goals about Germany's political organization which have formed the unquestioned basis of German policy for one generation. (We forget that it has now been 25 years since Germany was divided.) These goals no longer have the self evident rationale that they had for German and Western politicians in the past decades. Therefore, it seems to me the central historical question of the Germans is posed again, but in a context utterly different from the early post war period. And the question, to which the answer has always been of fateful importance to the whole of Europe, indeed to the whole world, is what form of unity if any should the Germans seek within Europe.

Is Bismarck's model, which he created in 1871, still a relevant model for the Germans now and in the future years? Can it still be adhered to now? It seems to me and to a growing number of the German public and policymakers that since the division, history has ruled out this particular model as invalid. It is in this connection that the Czech crisis, clearly showing the different interests of the two German states, is so important since it demonstrated the division as being very fundamental. In sum, when you have two German chiefs of Government meet and very active German diplomacy all over the East and the West, you see unfolding a search for a different formula, different from the one that was found in 1871 and terminated in 1945.

That takes me to my second point—an analysis of the German problem and present policy in the context of the Western system and East-West relations in Europe. Here I offer one very simple but crucial observation. The two German states, as you see them, are not political regimes which created foreign policies for themselves, but they represent foreign policies which created political regimes for themselves. In other words, both states are the outcome of a political confrontation, namely, the East-West conflict, which funda-

mentally shaped their constitutions, their internal issues of conflict, and their foreign policies. The last became completely integrated in the foreign policies of the respective systems the states were part of.

As you all know, in fact some of you were involved in the making of these policies, all this was not easy—the acceptance of a West German state was very difficult for the German political leaders in 1948 and 1949. For them a compensation lay in integrating within the West, German policy on German unity. The German policy of unification was part of the Western policy of strength against Communism. Unity was to be achieved through a collapse of Communism. Therefore there should be no recognition of East Germany, but hostility and ostracism toward that state with West Germany being the sole representative of Germany. Later, the Hallstein doctrine was added. Perhaps the most important point here is that German unity was regarded as a prerequisite to a detente between East and West. This basic tenet was adhered to not just by the West Germans but, for a while, by the West as a whole.

All this formed an internally consistent set of rules and policies, and now all this has crumbled. Three developments played a crucial role:

First, the building of the Berlin wall, which demonstrated clearly the failure of the East German regime to win the wholehearted support of its population, closing the last symbol of the negotiability of the German problem for the time being, and demonstrating that the East German regime was not about to collapse.

Second, the advent of the Kennedy administration with its very different policy of accepting the bi-polar system of spheres of influence, abandonning the notion of bringing about fundamental changes by rolling back Communism and seeking areas of common interest with the Soviet Union.

This change called into question the very basis of West German foreign policy, namely, that German unity should be the prerequisite of detente, in other words, that the solution of the most difficult problem between East and West should serve as the basis for detente.

Third, the example of French policy under General de Gaulle with its active involvement in Eastern Europe had an impact in West Germany.

The result of all this is that the basic tenets of West German foreign policy have changed very fundamentally. From the notion that unity should be achieved through Anschluss, or through a collapse, or through a Westernization of East Germany, one has now moved to the option of a special relationship between the two German states, since they still adhere to one nation, but a relationship definitely different from the insistence on a unitary state that formed the basic concept started from in 1945. From the idea that the settlement of the border question should be left to the Peace Conference, one has

moved to the idea that de facto one should settle on the status quo—the territorial status quo, whatever legal formula one finds for it. From the policy of isolation and no contact with East Germany, one has moved to a policy where the West German Chancellor and the East German Prime Minister meet and discuss their common problems. From the policy of the Hallstein doctrine one has moved to a revision of it to the extent that West Germany has entered into diplomatic relations with some countries that have diplomatic relations with East Germany, and finally, from the notion that unity of the two states is a prerequisite to overall detente, the Bonn Government has moved to the notion that only detente and active German contribution to it can improve the conditions for somehow overcoming the division, or at least making it more bearable.

One point in this connection is worth noting, namely, that originally this was not the policy of the Social Democrats alone but was more or less a tripartite policy started before they came to power by Christian Democratic Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder. It was continued under the great coalition, although with the SDP pushing and the CDU following reluctantly; the latter's Bavarian wing was often in opposition. This point is an important one, because the present domestic debate tends to overlook that "Ostpolitik" started as a common policy.

What we are actually observing here is a process of crumbling and transformation of all the policies that formed the basis of the German political system. We are observing a process where Germany is abandoning both the claim to one quarter of its former German territory, and the claim to the old Bismarckian model of the unitary state.

This is a policy which is immensely important to Germany itself and of fundamental importance to the future of Europe. It requires a good deal of courage on the part of the politicians who support it. It seems to me it is remarkable and important for three reasons:

First, it has demonstrated that in spite of all these fundamental changes, the democratic system was able to continue functioning without any major crisis. The pessimists who ten years ago thought that the German democracy could not stand fundamental crises or changes like this have been proved wrong.

Second, in this process which basically signifies a new openness towards the East, and increased activity there, Government and Opposition have been able to differ without endangering the ties and structures that have been built up in the West. On the contrary, as I shall explain below, the process has been accompanied by measures that have strengthened the ties with the West. This is a very long process which should and must require patience not only on the part of the politicians involved in Germany, but also patience on the part of the

outside world as well as a good deal of sympathetic understanding of the immense difficulties involved in transforming a basic set of policies.

That takes me to my third point—the goals of West German policies vis-à-vis East Germany and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and their potential consequences. Let me start with one comment, which again refers to the consequences. Let me start with one comment, which again refers to the Czech crisis. Besides demonstrating the depths of the division, at least to the Germans, and probably to the West as a whole, it also demonstrated the rigidity of the international system—the rigidity of the line of division between the two parts of Europe, as well as the fact that any policy based on the notion that one can change that division fundamentally or radically is not only illusory but dangerous.

It is from this starting point that present German policy has to be understood. If there is any hope for evolution, it lies in the abandonment of illusory goals and the acceptance of the status quo, while seeking very gradual change within it. This can be done by making the status quo more bearable and less dangerous, particularly in divided Germany and in Berlin. Finally an option must be kept open for a special relationship which takes into account that the two German states still belong to one nation and would not like (at least this is the Western view) to treat each other as foreign countries. This is one of the major German goals. This formula is a simple one, it seems to me, and a very modest objective if one looks at specific measures. In the long run, however, it is an ambitious goal.

This holds true in the three areas where West German policy is active now, symbolised by the towns of Erfurt and Kassel, Warsaw, and Moscow. In these three areas, two tenets are being followed. First, to sound out possibilities, something that in this sense was not done before. There were very careful overtures but not at this level. Second, one is trying to keep any expectation as low as possible, because high expectation with regard to these policies is very dangerous and may preclude success. I think the historic picture of 1970 may well be that of Willy Brandt in a window in Erfurt facing a cheering crowd and making a sign subduing their enthusiasm. He was perfectly aware that the situation was so precarious that any radical change would upset any policy that might improve the atmosphere.

Now what are the specific goals in the three areas of diplomatic activity? First, with regard to East Germany, it seems to me—and here I think one has to be realistic—there is very little hope for success. This is due to the fact that the East German regime is so utterly insecure and has to be immensely careful in making concessions. (I hope that later on Mr. Otto Wolff von Amerongen will elaborate on this point with his particular inside knowledge of East Germany.) What one could expect from Erfurt, Kassel and possible future

meetings between the two German Governments is nothing more than a gradual improvement of relations with regard to facilitating movement between the two countries and inducing a somewhat more tolerant, more cooperative behaviour on the part of the East German elite, notably with regard to West Berlin.

Second, with regard to Poland, the soundings made by German diplomacy can lead to no more than to seek a new formula for settling the Oder-Neisse problem, although that means quite a lot. Germany is trying to accept *grosso modo* the present territorial status quo and to find a legal formula for it, one that settles the problem in a way that avoids its becoming a serious issue of domestic politics. By finding this formula, the German diplomats would loosen up the situation in Europe, and induce a different behaviour on the Soviet side.

Third, with regard to the Soviet Union, the Bonn Government is pursuing several goals: first, to come to an agreement regarding the non-use of force, something which is crucial to Germany in its position as a divided country, and a very close observer of what happened in Czechoslovakia; second, to eliminate, at least in practice if not in legal formulations, the so-called enemy clauses in the UN Charter, which give the Soviet Union and its World War II allies the right of intervention in domestic German affairs—something about which the West Germans feel very strongly, given their exposed position; third, these overtures attempt to prepare the ground for a more durable formula for West Berlin, an initiative tied to the Four Power Talks on Berlin; and finally, and equally important for the West Germans, they are trying to induce a formula for a different evolutionary policy vis-à-vis East Germany. They are trying to make it possible for East Germany to evolve gradually toward a more liberal regime.

If there should be no visible results of this policy, one could argue that no damage will have been done. At least one thing will have been achieved, namely to make clear where the opposition to peaceful change in Europe really lies. But, and this is important for the opposition within Germany, one does create irreversable facts. Now that Brandt has met Stoph, certain things can no longer be said or done that were possible two years ago. And it is on these issues that the domestic debate between Government and Opposition is turning.

Let me make two points here—and here my bias in favour of the Governmental policy comes out very clearly. First, the new policy toward the East has been accompanied by a concomitant strengthening of ties with the West. Brandt has constantly stressed the necessity for strengthening Western structures. The Opposition has, however, been arguing: "Sure the Government stresses these things, but it does not do anything." This reproach is not borne out by the

acts, for you could argue that while very little has happened in terms of concessions and progress in the East, a good deal has happened in the West. At the The Hague meeting, for instance, European integration got a new emphasis and a new start. Another important event was the meeting between Brandt and President Nixon. In fact, if one wants to understand Brandt's rather bizarre insistence on discussing American-EEC relations, he has to see it in the context of active German policy towards the East, for Brandt is very adamant about pursuing these policies simultaneously. He is also perfectly aware of the increasing malaise in the United States toward EEC and its commercial policies, and wants to secure the Western flank in case of possible conflicts.

Secondly, even though to the outside there is no damage done in case of failure, in my mind the real problem and the genuine danger of "Ostpolitik" arises from its domestic connotations and consequences. And here everything depends on how the Opposition reacts in the future. It is not united behind this approach. One can see very clear differences between the various wings of the Opposition. Some now oppose a policy which they have advocated in the past and which they know does not have any alternative. Thus some conservative politicians, notably from the South, who used to be very keen in stating that there is no unity in the sense of Bismarck's model, have now become adamant supporters of that type of unity.

Much of this opposition is legitimate, but much depends on how it is pursued. Domestic stability could be seriously threatened, if for the sake of contrariness per se and of gaining power, the Opposition goes against a policy that it basically supports and to which there is no alternative.

In conclusion, it seems to me that the policy that West Germany is now pursuing is an immensely difficult enterprise which has to be conducted with an extraordinary amount of subtlety. Subtlety, because if one demands and presses for too much, one endangers the very success one wants to achieve. Because one is dealing with regimes, notably East Germany, that feel threatened and insecure, one has to put oneself into the other regime's shoes and try to understand this.

Brandt's policy is one that wants to accept the status quo and to change it at the same time. It is a policy that tries to keep the concessions balanced, for if West Germany accepts the status quo in Europe one must try to persuade the East to accept the status quo as well, notably in Berlin. Brandt's policy is unlikely to produce immediate and spectacular results, especially since there is the domestic problem to contend with. But it seems to me, it could be, and probably is, a contribution to a more rational relationship between East and West whether pursued in Berlin, in Erfurt, in Warsaw, in Moscow, or in Vienna.